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Abstract: Where regulatory systems overlap, courts and scholars often focus on the 
undesirable aspects of the overlap—the ways in which systems conflict. One such context 
involves the regulation of prescription drugs and medical devices by the FDA’s premarket 
evaluation processes and by state common-law tort and products liability actions. FDA 
regulation and state common law are often described as separate, conflicting regulatory 
systems. This Article challenges that description by proposing a model in which FDA 
premarket evaluation and state common law function as a single regulatory system. 
This model brings order to the Supreme Court’s seemingly inconsistent medical products 
preemption cases, permitting the Court’s decisions in Medtronic v. Lohr, Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Wyeth v. Levine, PLIVA v. Mensing, and other cases to be understood as having created an 
emergent, coherent, multilayered regulatory system that calibrates the requirements imposed 
by each layer to the deficit in information about the risk of each product category. The model 
also provides a strong critique of scores of recent lower court preemption decisions involving 
“combination products,” a new product category whose members consist of both a new drug 
and a high-risk device. In finding common law actions preempted, these courts claim to have 
faithfully applied Riegel’s holding. But using the model developed here, it is clear that courts 
have disrupted the calibrated regulatory system, allowing thousands or millions of people in 
the United States to be exposed to dangerous products whose risks have not been well-
characterized. Using the combination products decisions as a cases study, the model also 
highlights the far-reaching effects that even small changes to any one input may have on the 
function of an emergent system and the field that it regulates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A crucial challenge for products regulation is how to adequately ensure 
safety (and in some contexts, effectiveness) while limiting the adverse 
impacts of regulation on the development of and timely access to 
beneficial new technologies. Perhaps nowhere are the tensions between 
these goals as salient as in the regulation of medical products. New 
prescription drugs, medical devices, and biologics contributed to a 50% 
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decline in annual mortality1 and a twenty-nine-year increase in life 
expectancy in the United States during the twentieth century.2 But these 
products also injure or kill well over a million people in the United States 
each year.3 Quite literally, our lives depend on striking a balance between 
the competing objectives of ensuring safety, effectiveness, product 
development, and access. 
Understanding how any one regulatory system balances such 
competing objectives is a challenge. Understanding how multiple systems 
combine to balance competing objectives is even more challenging, but 
can provide important insights for scholars, regulators, the regulated 
entities, and those whom regulation is meant to protect. Medical products 
are regulated through the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
premarket evaluation pathways, the FDA’s post-market authorities, 
passive reporting requirements, state tort and products liability law, and a 
host of other formal and informal mechanisms. Courts and scholars often 
focus on just one of these regulatory inputs.4 Decisions and accounts that 
focus on two of the inputs tend to emphasize the conflicting obligations 
the inputs may impose on manufacturers.5 Courts, by the case-specific 
                                                     
  
   1. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, at 874 
tbl. 1420 (1999), https://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec31.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE9E-
FXRK] (reporting a death rate per 1,000 people per year in 1900 of 17.2 and in 1997 of 8.6). 
2. Id.  
3. See A Delicate Balance: FDA and the Reform of the Medical Device Approval Process: Hearing 
Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 112th Cong. 67, 68 (2011) (statement of Diana Zuckerman) (noting 
that over 500,000 metal-on-metal hip prostheses implanted into Americans are prone to breakdowns 
that cause pain, decreased mobility, lost work, repeat surgeries, post-operative rehabilitation, and 
other costly sequalae); Marcia Boumil, FDA Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemption of State 
Laws for “Parallel” Tort Claims, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2015) (citing estimates of 
over 100,000 deaths in the United States related to prescription drugs and medical devices); JUDITH 
A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES 3 (2016) 
[hereinafter JOHNSON 2016], https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42130.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8N2-6N7M] 
(citing FDA report of 116,086 device-related injuries and an independent analysis concluding there 
were 4,556 device-related deaths in one recent year); Justin M. Mann, FDA Adverse Event Reporting 
System: Recruiting Doctors to Make Surveillance a Little Less Passive, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 371, 
381 (2015) (citing 2013 data that 1.1 million voluntary reports of injuries and death were submitted 
to the FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS)); Thomas J. Moore, Michael R. Cohen & 
Curt D. Furberg, Serious Adverse Drug Events Reported to the Food and Drug Administration, 1998-
2005, 167 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1752, 1754 (2007) (stating that roughly one-sixth of FAERS reports 
were for deaths).  
4. See, e.g., Prevor v. FDA, 895 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing FDA premarket 
regulation); Susan B. Foote & Robert J. Berlin, Can Regulation be as Innovative as Science and 
Technology? The FDA’s Regulation of Combination Products, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619 (2005) 
(discussing the same).  
5. See infra sections I.B and I.D. 
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nature of their authority, and scholars, by self-imposed scope restrictions, 
typically focus on a single product or a product category.6 
This Article seeks to answer several questions. How do the individual 
systems that regulate all prescription medical products function together? 
Can the combined function of these systems be described as a coherent 
system? And most importantly, what balance between safety, 
effectiveness, product development, and timely access does the combined 
function strike? 
The first step in this inquiry is to define the scope of the regulated 
entity, as many products offer health benefits and pose health risks. The 
next step is to establish and prioritize the goals that regulation of the 
chosen entity is to achieve. Then it is necessary to identify the relevant 
individual regulatory inputs. Regulation is rarely achieved by a single 
body. More commonly, multiple regulatory inputs influence the activities 
of the regulated entity. Finally, and most difficult, it is necessary to 
understand how these inputs function together. The individual regulatory 
inputs may seek different policy goals or prioritize the same set of goals 
differently. The combined effect of the inputs may differ from the effects 
of any individual input. 
This Article limits its scope to prescription drugs, medical devices, 
biologics, and so-called “combination products,” which combine two or 
more of these categories. Although a much wider range of products affect 
human health,7 this Article focuses on those products that provide the 
greatest benefits and pose the greatest risks, and those that are among the 
most heavily regulated on the U.S. market. The Article recognizes the 
goals of ensuring effectiveness, fostering development, and allowing 
timely access to newly developed products.8 But both descriptively and 
                                                     
6. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (focusing on medical devices); Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2008) (focusing on prescription drugs); Mann, supra note 3 (focusing on 
prescription drugs). But see Boumil, supra note 3 (focusing on prescription drugs and medical 
devices).   
7. The FDA regulates many other products that may have health effects, including cosmetics, over-
the-counter drugs, foods, animal drugs, and nutritional supplements. Tort and products liability law 
regulate an even wider range of products that may affect health. 
8. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2015) (strengthening and 
extending application of least burdensome principle); FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (establishing the least burdensome principle for device regulation); 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(1984) (creating Abbreviated New Drug Approval pathway for generic drugs); Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (creating a Section 510(k) substantial 
equivalence pathway for intermediate risk devices).  
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normatively, this Article views ensuring safety as the primary goal of 
medical product regulation.9 
Two major regulatory inputs for medical products are federal 
premarket evaluation by the FDA and state tort and products liability 
law.10 The FDA’s premarket evaluation involves determining whether the 
overall benefits to the public associated with the use of a product outweigh 
the risks that come with the use of that product.11 State tort and products 
liability cases require determining whether a manufacturer acted 
reasonably to prevent harm to injured individuals—that is, whether the 
manufacturer reasonably ensured safety in view of the risks created by the 
product.12 These two inputs are often viewed as inherently conflicting.13 
State law may stand as an obstacle to the objectives of federal regulation, 
particularly the goal of fostering development and access through the 
creation of a uniform, nationwide regulatory regime.14 And federal 
regulation of drugs and devices may establish both a regulatory floor and 
ceiling, preempting state regulation.15 
                                                     
9. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2) (2012) (establishing the role of the FDA as being “[to] protect the 
public health by ensuring that . . . human . . . drugs are safe and effective [and that] there is reasonable 
assurance of the safety and effectiveness of devices intended for human use”); see also Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (amending the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act “to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human 
use”); Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (“An [a]ct [t]o protect the 
public health”); Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed 
by Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (prohibiting sale 
of “adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious . . . drugs [and] medicines”); Id. 
(prohibiting interstate movement of misbranded and adulterated drugs and devices).  
10. Catherine M. Sharkey, States Versus FDA, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (2015). Other 
regulatory inputs include the FDA’s post-market authorities, industry-created standards, market 
forces, and prescriber decisions. See infra Part V. 
11. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (requiring that new drug approval process must utilize “a structured 
risk-benefit assessment”); 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(A) (2012) (stating that standard for approval of 
high-risk medical device is “a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness”). 
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b)–(c) (Am. Law. Inst. 1998) 
(providing that standard for products liability design defect and failure to warn met where omission 
of reasonable alternative design or reasonable instructions or warnings “renders the product not 
reasonably safe”). 
13. David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt 
Failure-To-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 463–64 (2008). 
14. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008) (noting the likely effects on innovation “if 
juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations”). 
15. William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism’s Institutional 
Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE 
QUESTION 98 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). Preemption may leave injured patients with recourse 
against the manufacturer and limited means of obtaining compensation. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 333 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how preemption “effect[s] a radical curtailment of state 
common-law suits seeking compensation”); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 643 (2011) 
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This Article begins in Part I by articulating a different view: that 
although federal premarket approval and state tort and products liability 
law are separate regulatory inputs, together they form an emergent, 
functionally unified, coherent system that imposes a calibrated set of 
obligations on manufacturers to produce and disseminate information 
about product risk. This calibrated system has only fully emerged with the 
Supreme Court’s recent preemption decisions in cases involving 
prescription drugs and medical devices.16 But the calibration itself reflects 
certain mid-twentieth century understandings of drugs and devices. 
In the early to mid-twentieth century, most drugs were “discovered” in 
nature.17 Because information about drug structure, drug function, and 
human biochemistry was limited, the therapeutic and adverse effects of 
new drugs could only be characterized by exposing large numbers of 
humans to them.18 By contrast, in the mid- to late-twentieth century 
devices were created by “design.”19 Their components and the site and 
nature of their actions were known in advance; hence their risks were 
thought to be predictable.20 
Consistent with the large information deficit about new drug risk, the 
current regulatory system for drugs uses a two-layered approach that 
forces the production of large amounts of information about the risks of 
new drugs. The federal premarket New Drug Application (NDA) process 
provides the first layer. Although this process is the most rigorous 
evaluative process to which medical products are subjected,21 it cannot 
identify all significant new drug risks.22 State tort and products liability 
                                                     
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing how preemption “strips generic-drug consumers of 
compensation when they are injured by inadequate warnings”). 
16. The most recent of these cases was Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 
(2013). See infra section I.B. 
17. See Editorial, Looking Back on the Millennium in Medicine, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 42, 47 
(2000) [hereinafter Looking Back]. 
18. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 145–46 (2010) (describing mid-century clinical 
pharmacologists’ attitude “that only long-term animal studies and controlled clinical trials could 
permit an accurate assessment of the efficacy and safety of drugs new and old”). 
19. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § Sec. 201(h), 52 Stat. 1040, 
1041 (defining “device” as “instruments, apparatus, and contrivances”). 
20. For a more recent statement of this assumption, see FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 
AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, CONSIDERATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN MAKING 
BENEFIT-RISK DETERMINATIONS IN MEDICAL DEVICE PREMARKET APPROVALS, DE NOVO 
CLASSIFICATIONS, AND HUMANITARIAN DEVICE EXEMPTIONS 5 (2018) (“[T]he mechanism of action 
and modes of failure are generally more predictable and better understood for devices than for drugs 
and biological products.”). 
21. See infra section I.A. 
22. See, e.g., Boumil, supra note 3, at 6 (citing estimates that over 10% of FDA approved drugs 
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law serves as a second layer that forces the generation and dissemination 
of additional risk information as very large numbers of people encounter 
a new drug.23 
The highest-risk devices must be approved through the federal 
Premarket Approval (PMA) process.24 Although courts and others 
typically emphasize the rigorous nature of the PMA process,25 it is less 
rigorous than the NDA process for new drugs.26 But consistent with the 
view that device risks are predictable, once the FDA is satisfied that a 
reasonable assurance of safety has been provided, state-level information-
forcing would provide little additional risk information. And indeed, high-
risk medical device regulation relies on a single-layered approach, with 
state law actions preempted by FDA regulation. 
Sections I.A and I.B detail the federal and state layers of regulation, 
respectively. Section I.C then advances the descriptive and normative 
starting point for this Article, which is that these independent regulatory 
inputs—federal and state regulation of drugs and devices—function as a 
single system that forces manufacturers to generate and disclose 
information about product risk.27 This system is emergent, in that none of 
the individual regulatory inputs, including four distinct federal premarket 
processes,28 state tort and products liability law,29 and the Supreme 
Court’s medical products preemption decisions,30 were designed to create 
an overarching system that calibrates information-producing obligations 
to the information deficits that exist for all of the product categories. 
Rather, the calibrated function of the system emerges from the 
interactions of these different regulatory inputs. This descriptive account 
provides the normative position taken in the remainder of this Article: that 
                                                     
were subsequently found to have a safety risk severe enough to require a “black box” warning or 
market withdrawal). 
23. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 579 (2008) (noting FDA’s earlier position that state law 
provides an additional layer of protection against drug risks); Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra note 
10, at 1613. 
24. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317 (2008). 
25. See, e.g., id. at 317 (“Premarket approval is a ‘rigorous’ process.” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996))). 
26. See infra section I.A. 
27. See ; Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 
82 IND. L.J. 623, 628–29 (2007); Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical Innovation, 56 
JURIMETRICS 117, 138 (2016) (describing FDA premarket evaluation and state common law 
interactions as “encouraging the production and distribution of information”).  
28. See infra section I.A. 
29. See infra section I.B. 
30. See infra section I.D. 
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the quantity and quality of information required of a medical product 
should be directly proportional to how difficult it is for scientists, 
regulators, prescribers, and patients to predict the risks posed by that 
product. Section I.D discusses the Supreme Court’s pivotal role in 
creating this system. 
But almost as soon as the calibrated system of information generating 
and disclosure obligations emerged, lower court decisions in cases 
involving “combination products”—particularly products made up of a 
new drug and a high-risk device31—threatened to subvert the system. 
Manufacturers can gain FDA approval for some new drugs through the 
less rigorous PMA process by submitting the new drug as a constituent of 
a combination product.32 The resulting information deficit might be 
partially offset by state tort and products liability law actions. But courts 
have largely eliminated this second, post-market layer by finding state 
products liability actions in combination products cases to be preempted.33 
The resulting regulatory gap diminishes the safety of a large and rapidly 
growing category of medical products. 
Part II describes this challenge to the calibrated regulatory system for 
medical products. Section II.A provides an introduction to combination 
products. By industry estimates, as many as one-third of all new products 
in development are combination products.34 Unfortunately, predicting the 
risk of drug-device combination products is often more difficult than 
predicting the risks of new drugs or high-risk devices. Section II.B 
illustrates the regulatory gap, focusing on one extensive line of cases 
stemming from thousands of injuries related to a drug-device combination 
product used in spinal surgery. Section II.B concludes that the rise of 
combination products and the creation of the regulatory gap may alter the 
overall system of medical product regulation such that it no longer 
calibrates information generating and disclosing obligations to risk 
information deficits. In effect, a new regulatory system, which sacrifices 
some of the normative advantages of the existing system, may be 
emerging. 
To illustrate this change, Part III examines the immediate causes of the 
regulatory gap. Section III.A explains how Congress created the federal 
                                                     
31. “Combination products” are defined as products that consist of more than one product type, 
that is, some combination of a drug and device, a biologic and a device, a drug and a biologic, or a 
drug and a device and a biologic. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (2019).  
32. See infra section I.A. 
33. See infra section I.B. 
34. Michael Drues, Combination Products 101: A Primer For Medical Device Makers, MED 
DEVICE ONLINE (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.meddeviceonline.com/doc/combination-products-a-
primer-for-medical-device-makers-0001 [https://perma.cc/NA6N-HQSL]. 
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side of the gap by crafting a regulatory regime for combination products 
that allows manufacturers to gain FDA approval of certain new drugs 
through the PMA process. By itself, this did not represent a serious threat 
to the calibrated system described in Part I. But in recent years the lower 
federal and state courts have held that state tort and products liability 
claims are preempted in a growing number of cases. Section III.B presents 
the first comprehensive review of court decisions in cases involving drug-
device combination products to analyze the approach that courts have 
taken in determining the preemptive effect of FDA regulation. This 
section argues that most courts’ preemption analyses have relied on three 
unwarranted assumptions about the proper construction of the term 
“combination products” and about the preemptive reach of federal 
regulation of medical devices. Section III.C offers some tentative 
explanations for why courts have failed to examine the premises that 
underlie these assumptions. 
Part IV explores whether the regulatory gap could be closed, and 
concomitantly whether the existing emergent system of regulation can be 
preserved. On the federal side, the FDA retains sufficient statutory 
authority to channel more combination product approvals through the new 
drug pathway and to demand greater rigor in pivotal trials used to support 
approvals under the device pathway. But a number of ethical and practical 
considerations will limit the impact of these options. On the state side, 
courts could under existing statute, regulation, and Supreme Court 
precedent find fewer cases preempted, allowing state law to function as it 
does in cases of injury involving FDA-approved new drugs. But at most 
these moves can only narrow, not fully close, the gap. Thus, the emergent 
regulatory system described in Part I may prove to be ephemeral. 
Finally, in Part V, this Article returns to the view of medical products 
regulation as an emergent system. By viewing the distinct regulatory 
inputs as a single, emergent system, seemingly bizarre features of any 
single input may be understood as serving a rational function. This 
approach also emphasizes the far-reaching effects that even small changes 
to any one input may have on the function of the emergent system. This 
way of viewing regulatory inputs also aligns with the views of the 
regulated entities, which are subjected to all of the inputs. The main 
challenge to this approach is its sensitivity to initial choices, such as which 
regulatory inputs are most relevant. 
I. MEDICAL PRODUCTS REGULATION 
Regulating medical products requires finding an optimal balance 
between the often-competing policy objectives of assuring safety, 
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efficacy, innovation, and access.35 Over the course of the twentieth 
century, the development of new prescription drugs, medical devices, and 
biologics contributed to a fifty percent decline in mortality rates36 and to 
a twenty-nine-year increase in life expectancy in the United States.37 But 
injuries and deaths resulting from these products are widespread and 
costly.38 Medical devices injure or kill well over 100,000 people in the 
United States each year.39 In 2013, prescription drug use resulted in more 
than 1.1 million voluntary reports to the FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting 
System.40 One-sixth of these reports are deaths.41 And these numbers 
likely underestimate the harms caused by medical products: empirical 
evidence suggests that most serious adverse events go unreported.42 
One way to ensure safety would be to subject every new medical 
product to a maximally rigorous assessment before the product is 
marketed and to continuous close monitoring afterward. But other policy 
considerations weigh against such extensive regulation. The costs 
imposed by premarket review can discourage manufacturers from 
engaging in the research and development necessary to create new, 
potentially life-saving products.43 And extensive premarket review can 
delay patients’ access to newly-developed products.44 Further, post-
market liability under state common law can drive FDA-approved, 
                                                     
35. Robert M. Califf, Benefit-Risk Assessments at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 317 
JAMA 693 (2017). 
36. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1, at 874 tbl.1420. 
37. Id. at 874, tbl.1421. 
38. See Boumil, supra note 3, at 6. 
39. JOHNSON 2016, supra note 3, at 3. 
40. See, e.g., Boumil, supra note 3, at 6; Mann, supra note 3, at 381 (citing 2013 data). 
41. Moore, Cohen & Furberg, supra note 3, at 1754. 
42. Yasser M. Alatawi & Richard A. Hansen, Empirical Estimation of Under-Reporting in the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), 16 EXPERT OPINION ON 
DRUG SAFETY 761 (2017); James R. Ward & P. John Clarkson, An Analysis of Medical Device-
Related Errors: Prevalence and Possible Solutions, 28 J. MED. ENG’G & TECH. 2, 5 (2004) 
(describing underreporting rates for device-related medical errors ranging from 10 to 80%); see also 
A Delicate Balance: FDA and the Reform of the Medical Device Approval Process: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. On Aging, 112th Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Frederic S. Resnic), 
http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/4132011.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3WU-LUUL] (citing 
GAO estimate that only 0.5% of medical device adverse events are reported to the FDA). 
43. Aaron V. Kaplan et al., Medical Device Development: From Prototype to Regulatory Approval, 
109 CIRCULATION 3068, 3072 (2004) (“[T]he demonstration of safety and efficacy for a new medical 
device is a long, arduous, and expensive developmental path.”); Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra 
note 10, at 1610–11; see also David Steinberg, Geoffrey Horwitz & Daphne Zohar, Building a 
Business Model in Digital Medicine, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 910, 914 (2015) (noting that the 
premarket studies required to bring a new high-risk device to market can cost nearly $100 million). 
44. Califf, supra note 35, at 693. 
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beneficial products from the market.45 Thus, ensuring safety must be 
balanced against the dangers posed by overly-stringent regulation. 
Central to striking this critical balance is understanding product risk. 
This Part describes the regulatory regimes—focusing on the FDA’s pre-
market authorities and state tort and products liability actions—that apply 
to prescription drugs, medical devices, and biological products. 
Section I.A sets out the statutes and regulations that make up the federal 
regulatory regime. Section I.B describes the states’ tort and products 
liability laws, and the roles they play in regulating drugs and devices. 
Section I.C then characterizes the federal and state roles as two layers of 
a single regulatory system structured by certain twentieth century 
conceptions of medical product risk. Under this account, manufacturers’ 
obligations to produce and disseminate information are calibrated to the 
information deficits concerning product risk which exist for each product 
category and to the burdens imposed by regulation. In addition to being 
descriptive, this account provides the normative position from which the 
remainder of the Article will proceed. Section I.D then examines the 
Supreme Court’s pivotal role in creating this regulatory system. 
A. Federal Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices 
The FDA sorts, or “classifies,” each medical product submitted for 
approval according to the statutory definitions of “drugs,” “devices,” and 
“biological products” contained in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA).46 The FDA then assigns each product to the FDA center 
responsible for regulating the products in the relevant statutorily defined 
class.47 The assigned center regulates the product under the appropriate 
statutory authorities. Under this system, a product’s statutory definition 
determines on a categorical basis the quantity and quality of information 
a manufacturer must provide to gain approval to market the product in the 
United States. 
                                                     
45. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 227–28 (2011) (noting the impact of product liability 
suits on the availability of childhood vaccines). 
46. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (2012). Biological products are defined in the Public Health Services 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘biological product’ means a virus, therapeutic serum, 
toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except 
any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of 
arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.”). 
47. The FDA is divided into sub-Agency level centers. Drugs are assigned to the Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research (CDER) and devices to the Center for Devices and Radiologic Health 
(CDRH). 
 
10 - Horvath.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2019  10:49 AM 
1708 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1697 
 
The FDA has significant latitude to classify a product as a drug or a 
device. The Agency may find that a product satisfies the statutory 
definition of “drug” under a number of provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 321.48 
The most relevant definition establishes that drugs are “articles intended 
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease in man.”49 This definition is sufficiently broad that 
“[c]onceptually, all FDA-regulated medical products meet the definition 
of ‘drug.’”50 Out of this set of products, the FDCA defines a subset that 
also satisfy the definition of “devices.”51 Devices are described in terms 
that suggest a mechanical function: “instrument[s], apparatus[es], 
implement[s], machine[s], contrivance[s], implant[s].”52 A product that 
meets one or more of these descriptions is defined as a device if it “does 
not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within 
or on the body of man.”53 Thus, the FDA may classify a product as a 
device even if it achieves some of its effects through chemical means, as 
where those effects are not intended (for instance, are side effects) or 
where the chemical action takes place apart from the body (as occurs in 
many diagnostic tests).54 On the other hand, the FDA may classify a 
                                                     
48. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012). The full text of the definition provides that “drugs” are:  
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopœia, official Homœopathic 
Pharmacopœia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of 
them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use 
as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C). 
Id. 
49. Id. 
50. FDA, FINAL GUIDANCE, CLASSIFICATION OF PRODUCTS AS DRUGS AND DEVICES & 
ADDITIONAL PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION ISSUES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA 
STAFF (2017), https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm258946.htm 
[https://perma.cc/N67F-B7G4]. 
51. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). The full text of the definition provides that a “device” is:  
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other 
similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is—(1) recognized 
in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to 
them, (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) intended to affect 
the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve 
its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other 
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary 
intended purposes. 
Id. 
52. Id. “[I]n vitro reagent” is the one descriptor that does not suggest a mechanical function. Id.  
53. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3). 
54. See FDA, supra note 50, at 7–8. 
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mechanical product as a drug if the product achieves its intended purposes 
even in part through chemical action.55 
Once the FDA has determined that a product satisfies the statutory 
definition of a drug or device, the Agency assigns regulatory 
responsibility to either the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) or the Center for Devices and Radiologic Health (CDRH), 
respectively. This assignment determines the set of statutory authorities 
to which a product is subjected. A manufacturer seeking approval to 
market a “new drug”56 must submit a New Drug Application (NDA),57 
which imposes the most rigorous information-generating and disclosure 
requirements to which any FDA-regulated product is subjected.58 
Manufacturers must typically generate extensive amounts of new 
information about risk by conducting scientific studies, including at least 
two well-designed, Phase 3 clinical trials,59 which “are intended to gather 
the additional information about effectiveness and safety that is needed to 
evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug . . . .”60 These 
trials involve several thousand subjects and typically require several years 
to complete.61 Phase 3 trials are scientifically rigorous, employing the 
randomized assignment of subjects to active treatment and control arms, 
double-blinding (of subjects and investigators), pre-specification of 
endpoints, and detailed statistical analyses.62 Manufacturers must also 
                                                     
55. Id. Historically, the FDA has attempted to define some devices as drugs in order to bring those 
devices within the Agency’s drug regulatory authority. See, e.g., AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 
(2d Cir. 1968) (FDA defining nylon ligature as a drug); United States v. 48 Dozen Packages, More or 
Less, of Gauze Bandage Labeled in Part Sterilized, 94 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1938) (discussing the FDA’s 
definition of gauze bandages as drugs). 
56. “New drugs” are defined as drugs which are “not generally recognized, among experts . . . as 
safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended,” or which “[have] 
not . . . been used to a material extent or for a material time under such conditions.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(p). 
57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).  
58. Jordan Paradise, Reassessing Safety for Nanotechnology Combination Products: What Do 
Biosimilars Add to Regulatory Challenges for the FDA?, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 465, 479 (2012). 
59. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2019); see also FDA, DEVELOPMENT & APPROVAL PROCESS (DRUGS) 
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm [https://perma.cc/D5
BC-FJAE]. Before conducting Phase 3 trials, a manufacturer must present basic data and conduct 
Phase1 and 2 clinical trials. Id. Phase one trials involve twenty to eighty healthy individuals to 
determine the metabolism and actions of the drug, its side effects, and early evidence on effectiveness. 
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2019). Phase 2 trials include up to several hundred patients with the disease 
or condition for which the drug is to be marketed, in order “to evaluate the effectiveness . . . and to 
determine the common short-term side effects and risks.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b). 
60. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c); FDA, THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STEP 3: CLINICAL RESEARCH (2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm [https://perma.cc/TE75-XGR4]. 
61. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c). 
62.  Sanket S. Dhruva, Lisa A. Bero & Rita F. Redberg, Strength of Study Evidence Examined by 
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disclose extensive amounts of information that already exists.63 
In contrast to the NDA process for new drugs, the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the “Hatch-
Waxman Act”)64 established a relatively quick, low-cost process (the 
“Abbreviated New Drug Application,” or ANDA) for generic drugs.65 
Because generic drugs are copies of NDA-approved new drugs for which 
extensive safety and effectiveness information has already been generated 
and disclosed, an ANDA requires manufacturers to conduct only a small-
scale study to prove “bioequivalence”—that the generic drug becomes 
available at the site of action in the body at the same rate and to the same 
extent as that of the brand drug.66 No new safety information is required.67 
The Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA68 create a very 
different premarket evaluation regime for devices. The MDA establishes a 
three-tiered regulatory scheme, dividing devices into “Classes” depending on 
the level of risk they present.69 No premarket assessment is required for the 
lowest-risk (Class I) devices.70 Manufacturers who seek to market 
intermediate-risk (some Class I and most Class II) devices must submit a 
Section 510(k) “premarket notification,” including information establishing 
that the device is “substantially equivalent” to a device already on the 
market.71 In general, Section 510(k) submissions do not require clinical trials 
                                                     
the FDA in Premarket Approval of Cardiovascular Devices, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2679, 2684 
(2009); Jonas Z. Hines et al., Left to Their Own Devices: Breakdowns in United States Medical Device 
Premarket Review, 7 PLOS MED. 1, 6 (2010); Daniel B. Kramer et al., Premarket Clinical Evaluation 
of Novel Cardiovascular Devices: Quality Analysis of Premarket Clinical Studies Submitted to the 
Food and Drug Administration 2000–2007, 17 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 2, 4–6 (2010).  
63. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(vi) (2019) (requiring disclosure of animal data and 
information about related drugs). 
64. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012)). 
65. Id. 
66. Jordan Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A Case 
Study of the FDA and Implications for Nanobiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 598, 601 n.28 
(2009). The Hatch-Waxman Act imposes on generic drug makers a “duty of sameness” regarding 
bioequivalence, the active ingredient(s), and the product label. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (v). 
67. Emily M. Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 262 (2012). 
68. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 360 et seq.). 
69. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (establishing classification scheme for devices). 
70. FDA, Classify Your Medical Device: Class I/II Exemptions (2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice
/ucm051549.htm [https://perma.cc/MQN3-2DTW]. Manufacturers must comply with post-marketing 
requirements, including registration, labeling, and Good Manufacturing Practices. Id.  
71. 21 C.F.R. § 807.87(f) (2019). The term “510(k)” comes from the section of the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act that created the premarket notification process, which is now codified at 21 U.S.C. 
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that demonstrate safety. Manufacturers seeking to market the highest-risk 
(Class III) devices must submit a lengthy and detailed “Premarket Approval” 
(PMA) application, which, like the NDA process, requires manufacturers to 
produce and disseminate information about risk.72 The disclosure requirements 
are similar to those for a new drug undergoing the NDA process.73 
Although courts and others typically emphasize the rigorous nature of 
the PMA process,74 the information-generating requirements are not as 
extensive as those imposed by the NDA process for new drugs. A PMA 
application may be supported by a single pivotal trial, as opposed to the 
multiple Phase 3 clinical trials typically required for new drug approvals.75 
Nearly two-thirds of original PMA approvals for cardiovascular devices 
have been granted on the basis of a single “pivotal” study.76 Medical 
device regulation must employ the “least burdensome approach,” 
minimizing the amount of information required to provide a reasonable 
assurance of safety.77 And the recently-enacted 21st Century Cures Act78 
requires the FDA to consider shifting the manufacturer’s information-
generating obligations to the post-market phase when possible.79 
The information-generating requirements for high-risk device approval 
are further reduced by FDA practice. Several groups of academic medical 
researchers have pointed to weaknesses in the design of the pivotal trials 
the FDA accepted, including a lack of randomization in 73% and a lack 
of blinding in 86% of trials.80 In the views of the authors, many studies 
were poorly designed and did not adequately control for the relevant 
variables.81 And many were flawed in other ways—they were of short 
duration, did not clearly define safety and effectiveness end points, failed 
                                                     
§ 360(k) (2012). 
72. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a). 
73. Id. (requiring disclosure of known risk information, device composition, and manufacturing 
controls). 
74. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317 (2008) (“Premarket approval is a 
‘rigorous’ process.” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996)). 
75. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(D)(ii) (requiring “one or more well-controlled investigations”).  
76. Dhruva, Bero & Redberg, supra note 62, at 2684. 
77. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(6)(C)(i)(II). 
78. Pub. L. No. 114-255. 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
79. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(5)(C). 
80. Dhruva, Bero & Redberg, supra note 62, at 2683 (noting that the majority of PMAs for 
cardiovascular devices were neither blinded nor randomized); Hines et al., supra note 62, at 2; Kramer 
et al., supra note 62, at 5 (noting that 40% of PMAs studied had employed randomization); Vinay K. 
Rathi et al., Characteristics of Clinical Studies Conducted Over the Total Product Life Cycle of High-
Risk Therapeutic Medical Devices Receiving FDA Premarket Approval in 2010 and 2011, 314 JAMA 
604, 607–08 (2015). 
81. Kramer et al., supra note 62, at 4. 
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to collect complete data on important patient comorbidities, contained 
discrepancies in the numbers of patients enrolled and reported, and used 
“post hoc” data analyses.82 These flaws led one group to conclude that 
premarket approval “by the FDA is often based on studies that . . . may be 
prone to bias.”83 
Practical and ethical concerns limit the FDA’s ability to eliminate the 
information deficits related to medical device risk. Conducting 
randomized, double-blinded studies involving invasive procedures such 
as device implantation is generally considered unethical.84 And medical 
devices are used in fewer patients than are drugs, making large device 
studies impractical. Nonetheless, it is clear that both by statute and in the 
FDA’s practice the information requirements for high-risk medical 
devices are not as robust as the requirements for new drugs. 
Compared with the PMA process for high-risk devices, the Section 
510(k) notification process for intermediate-risk devices imposes less 
stringent information disclosure requirements and no general requirement 
to generate new risk information. The manufacturer must disclose 
information that establishes the device is “substantially equivalent” to one 
already on the market (the “predicate device”).85 Except in rare 
circumstances, the manufacturer is not required to generate new 
information about risk through clinical trials.86 Because neither the 
manufacturer of the new device nor the manufacturer of its predicate 
device are required to submit new information about risk, courts have 
recognized that “devices that enter the market through § 510(k) have 
‘never been formally reviewed under the MDA for safety or efficacy.’”87 
                                                     
82. Dhruva, Bero & Redberg, supra note 62, at 2683–84. 
83. Id. at 2679. 
84. Id. at 2683. But see Rasha Al-Lamee et al., Percutaneous Coronary Intervention in Stable 
Angina (ORBITA): A Double-Blind, Randomised Controlled Trial, 391 LANCET 31 (2018) (reporting 
a multicenter U.K. study in which the control group was subjected to invasive sham coronary stenting 
procedures); Karolina Wartolowska et al., Use of Placebo Controls in the Evaluation of Surgery: 
Systematic Review, 348 BMJ g3253 (2014) (arguing that systematic review of fifty-three studies 
subjecting control subjects to sham surgery demonstrated minimal risk to subjects and significant 
benefit to medical knowledge base). 
85. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). The FDCA defines a substantially equivalent device as 
one that has the same intended uses as its predicate, and that has either the same technological 
characteristics as its predicate or that “has different technological characteristics” and is shown to be 
“as safe and effective” and does not raise new safety concerns. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A).  
86. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY & FDA: SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE BASED PATHWAY 6 
(2019), https://www.fed.gov/media/11269/download [https://perma.cc/5PD6-SMBF] (describing 
preference to evaluate intermediate risk devices based on non-clinical trial evidence). 
87. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323 (2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 493 (1996)). 
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As this review of federal premarket evaluation demonstrates, medical 
products enter the U.S. market with different quanta of information about 
risk, depending on the product category to which they belong. New drugs 
enter the market through the NDA process, which produces the most 
extensive quantum of risk information. Generic drugs enter the market 
with a more extensive quantum of risk information than new drugs, even 
though the ANDA process does not require new clinical data on risk. The 
information about generic drug risk includes the information generated by 
the manufacturer of NDA-approved drug of which the generic drug is a 
copy. In addition, by the time a generic drug enters the market, very large 
numbers of people will likely have been exposed to it for a long period of 
time, providing additional risk information. High-risk devices enter the 
market after PMA approval, which results in the production of a less 
extensive quantum of information than that produced by the NDA 
process. Intermediate-risk devices enter the market through Section 
510(k) notification with the smallest quantum of risk information. 
B. The States’ Roles in Regulating Drugs and Devices: Common Law 
and Preemption Jurisprudence 
The states provide the other important input to medical products 
regulation.88 As a feature of their sovereignty, “[t]he States’ core police 
powers have always included authority . . . to protect the health, safety, 
and welfare of their citizens.”89 Accordingly, states can regulate product 
safety through legislative and administrative means.90 States also regulate 
product safety by providing common law remedies to injured consumers 
through tort and products liability law actions.91 Most relevant here, state 
products liability law provides for “failure-to-warn” actions, where the 
“foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced 
or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings.”92 
Although courts and commentators often focus on the role these actions 
play in providing injured consumers the possibility of compensation93 and 
incentivizing manufacturers to produce safer products and provide 
                                                     
88. Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra note 10, at 1611. 
89. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
90. States, for example, regulate certain flame-retardant chemicals. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 325F.071 (West 2015) (banning certain chemicals); CAL. VEH. CODE § 24016(a)(2) (West 2019) 
(requiring motor to automatically disengage in electric bicycles).   
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1998). 
92. Id. § 2(c). 
93. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 643 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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adequate warnings,94 the focus here is on another role that failure-to-warn 
claims can play: these claims can incentivize or even force manufacturers 
to disclose risk information and to conduct additional research that 
generates new risk information.95 
But the states’ legislative and administrative powers over medical 
products are limited: where state law overlaps with federal law, federal 
law may render state law inoperative.96 Preemption doctrine provides the 
analytic framework through which courts manage these overlaps.97 
Congress can expressly preempt state laws.98 Courts may find state laws 
to be impliedly preempted where Congress legislated in such a way as to 
indicate an intention to occupy the regulatory field,99 where compliance 
with both the federal and state requirements is impossible,100 or where 
state law stands as an obstacle to Congress’s purposes and objectives.101 
The MDA expressly preempts state regulation of medical devices through 
statutory or administrative premarket approval schemes.102 Lower courts 
have held that FDA approval of prescription drugs impliedly preempts 
state legislative or administrative attempts to ban sales of the drug.103 
Courts have also applied the federal preemption doctrine to limit the 
role of state tort and products liability law in regulating certain 
prescription drugs and medical devices. Because the FDCA does not 
contain an express preemption provision for prescription drugs,104 
                                                     
94. Id. at 644. 
95. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 
308 (2007). But see Cahoy, supra note 27, at 625–26 (arguing that potential tort liability 
disincentivizes manufacturers from generating additional risk information). 
96. The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law is supreme when a state law conflicts with 
it. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
97. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 256 (2011). 
98. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). 
99. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). 
100. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
101. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). For a concise taxonomy and explanation of 
federal preemption doctrine, see English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990). 
102. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. at 316 (noting that the 
MDA “swept back” state-level premarket approval systems for devices); id. at 340 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting that § 360k expressly preempts state premarket approval systems). 
103. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. CIV.A. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 
2014); see also Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 859 (2017) 
(“[F]ederal regulation is now generally characterized as dominant in this area.”); Patricia J. Zettler, 
Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 430 (2015) (“[T]he 
conventional wisdom . . . is that states regulate medical practice, while the federal government 
regulates medical products.”).  
104. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). In fact, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 
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preemption in the prescription drug context arises solely from the 
workings of implied conflict preemption. The Supreme Court has 
established that state tort and products liability verdicts against 
manufacturers create state requirements.105 These requirements may 
conflict with FDA-imposed labeling requirements if compliance with both 
is impossible or if a state requirement would “stand[] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”106 When compliance with both is impossible, courts’ 
preemption analyses of failure-to-warn claims have focused on whether 
the manufacturer is able to change the drug’s labeling without prior FDA 
approval to satisfy a jury-imposed requirement under state tort or products 
liability law.107 In Wyeth v. Levine 108 the Supreme Court reasoned that the 
manufacturers of new (or, “brand”) drugs, whose products reach the 
market through the NDA process, may change the labeling through the 
FDA’s Changes Being Effected (CBE) regulation without the FDA’s prior 
approval.109 Thus, compliance with state tort and product liability law and 
federal labeling requirement is not impossible.110 Further, the Wyeth Court 
held that state tort liability did not present an obstacle to the FDA’s 
mission of ensuring that prescription drugs are safe and effective.111 
By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that ANDA approval preempts 
failure to warn claims against generic drug manufacturers.112 Generic drug 
manufacturers are not permitted to change the drug labeling except to 
maintain their label in conformity with the brand drug’s label.113 In both 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing114 and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. 
Bartlett,115 the Court found that this rendered generic manufacturers’ 
                                                     
contained a savings clause limiting the preemptive effect to “direct and positive conflicts” between 
federal and state law. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87-781, 76 Stat. 793 (1962). 
105. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504, 521 (1992). 
106. English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). 
107. Guilbeau v. Pfizer Inc., 880 F.3d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[The preemption analysis] turn[s] 
on whether a drug-maker may or may not change its label to add a warning without prior approval 
from the FDA.”). 
108. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
109. Id. at 568 (noting that the “changes being effected” regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2019), 
allows manufacturers to add or strengthen labeling language to ensure safety).  
110. Id. at 573. 
111. Id. at 581. 
112. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
113. Id. at 616. 
114. 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
115. 570 U.S. 472 (2013). 
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compliance with differing state common law and FDA-imposed 
requirements impossible.116 In both cases the Court’s majority only 
applied an impossibility analysis. 
For medical devices, both express and implied preemption principles 
are relevant. The MDA includes an express preemption provision, 21 
U.S.C. § 360k, establishing that: 
[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to 
a device . . . any requirement . . . which is different from, or in 
addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the 
device, and . . . which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the 
device . . . .117 
In Riegel v. Medtronic. Inc.,118 the Court held that PMA approval of a 
high-risk device results in device-specific requirements for design, 
manufacturing, and labeling with which the manufacturer must comply, 
thus triggering section 360k.119 Any state failure-to-warn or design defect 
action that led to a damages award would create a state-imposed 
requirement different from or in addition to the requirements established 
by the FDA through the PMA approval process. Under Riegel, these state 
law actions are thus expressly barred by section 360k.120 
By contrast, for intermediate-risk devices marketed through the Section 
510(k) notification pathway, design defect and failure-to-warn claims may 
escape express preemption. Premarket Section 510(k) review focuses on 
whether a new device is substantially equivalent to an already-approved 
intermediate-risk device.121 In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,122 the Supreme Court 
held that Section 510(k) evaluation does “not ‘require’ [a cleared device] to 
take any particular form for any particular reason.”123 Because Section 510(k) 
clearance does not impose device-specific requirements, the MDA’s express 
preemption provision is not triggered.124 
                                                     
116. Id. at 614–15; Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 476. The Court granted Auer deference to the FDA’s 
interpretation of its own regulation, that the CBE was not available to generic manufacturers. Id. 
(citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  
117. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012) 
118. 522 U.S. 312 (2008). 
119. Riegel, 522 U.S. at 323–24. 
120. Id. at 330.  
121. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A)(ii); 21 C.F.R. § 807.87(f) (2019). 
122. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
123. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493. 
124. But see Ralph F. Hall & Michelle Mercer, Rethinking Lohr: Does “SE” Mean Safe and 
Effective, Substantially Equivalent, or Both?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 737, 739 (2012) (arguing 
that the precedential value of Lohr has become “highly questionable”). 
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But even where claims against device manufacturers survive express 
preemption, they may be barred by implied preemption. In Buckman Co. 
v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,125 the Supreme Court held that suits 
alleging fraud on the FDA stood as an obstacle to the Agency’s ability to 
achieve the “delicate balance of statutory objectives” which Congress 
mandated.126 Buckman potentially subjected all state law claims to 
preemption under an obstacle preemption theory. However, the Riegel 
Court later held that “parallel claims” may survive preemption analysis.127 
State law claims must fit through a “narrow gap,” avoiding preemption 
only if they do not seek to impose requirements that are “different from, 
or in addition to” federal requirements, and only if they do not seek merely 
to enforce federal requirements.128 The result is that in some circuits most 
suits against the manufacturers of PMA-approved devices are barred 
either by express or by implied preemption, while in other circuits many 
failure-to-warn claims will fit through the statutory gap.129 
These distinct frameworks result in different roles for state tort and 
product liability law. The role of state failure-to-warn claims is practically 
non-existent for PMA-approved devices and ANDA-approved generic 
drugs. Failure-to-warn claims play a somewhat uncertain role for Section 
510(k)-cleared devices. And for NDA-approved brand drugs, failure-to-
warn claims’ role is relatively robust. 
C. An Information-Forcing Account of Medical Product Regulation 
Pre-market evaluation by the FDA and post-market failure-to-warn 
claims under state tort and products liability law are often described as 
separate, inherently conflicting regulatory systems.130 Federal regulation 
                                                     
125. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
126. Id. at 341. 
127. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (“[Section] 360k does not prevent a State 
from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state 
duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal requirements.”). 
128. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776–77 (D. Minn. 2009); Jean M. Eggen, 
Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Preemption of Medical Device “Parallel Claims,” 9 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L., 159, 161 (2013). 
129. See George Horvath, Comment, Recovery and Preemption: The Collision of the Medicare 
Secondary Payer Act and the Medical Device Amendments, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1379 n.184 
(2015) (listing cases on both sides of the circuit split). 
130. Richard A. Epstein, What Tort Theory Tells Us About Federal Preemption: The Tragic Saga 
of Wyeth v. Levine, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 485, 488 (2010) (arguing for field preemption of 
state tort and products liability law in medical products context); Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal 
Primary in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that 
federal regulation preempts state statutory and administrative regulation of prescription drugs). 
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may preempt state law, leaving injured patients with no recourse and 
limited means of obtaining compensation.131 State law may impose 
requirements that directly conflict with federal requirements.132 And state 
law may stand as an obstacle to the objectives of federal regulation, 
particularly the goal of fostering innovation and access through the 
creation of a single, nationwide regulatory regime.133 
Another description of state tort and products liability actions is that they 
serve as complements to federal regulation of drug and devices, filling in 
gaps left by the FDCA or created by the FDA’s lack of resources or 
attention.134 This section goes further, arguing that federal regulation and 
state failure-to-warn actions function as single emergent system that 
ensures the production and dissemination of a sufficient quantum of 
information about medical product risk to allow regulators, prescribers, and 
patients to determine that a product has a reasonable assurance of safety. 
This functional account is both descriptive and normative. As a descriptive 
account, it provides a better explanation for the Supreme Court’s 
preemption holdings in the drug and device cases than other explanations. 
And as a normative matter, it is consistent with the important goal of 
ensuring safety, which federal and state regulation share. 
In this account, the medical products regulatory system utilizes three 
sources of information about drug and device risk: (1) information that 
can be obtained simply by categorizing a product as a drug or device; 
(2) information generated before and during the FDA’s premarket 
evaluation processes; and (3) information generated or disclosed through 
discovery and trial in failure-to-warn cases. The first of these reflects a 
twentieth-century understanding of medical products: that the ability to 
predict risk depends on whether a product is discovered or designed. In 
the mid-twentieth century, when the federal drug regulatory regime and 
state common law systems were expanding, most drugs were relatively 
small molecules, which had been “discovered” in nature.135 In the years 
just prior to the original FCDA, Gerhard Domagk had discovered the 
precursor to the antibiotic sulfanilamide in a red dye, and Sir Alexander 
                                                     
131. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 643 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing 
how preemption “strips generic-drug consumers of compensation when they are injured by inadequate 
warnings”); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing 
how preemption “effect[s] a radical curtailment of state common-law suits seeking compensation”). 
132. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 617–18 (majority opinion). 
133. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326 (majority opinion) (noting the likely effects on innovation “if 
juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations”). 
134. See Cahoy, supra note 27, at 629; Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 13, at 463; Laakman, supra 
note 27, at 138–41. 
135. Looking Back, supra note 17. 
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Fleming had isolated penicillin from a moldy petri dish.136 At that time, 
the limited understanding of drug structure and function of human 
biochemistry made it nearly impossible to predict the existence of specific 
risks and to estimate the magnitude of those risks. Drug risks could be 
adequately characterized only by exposing large numbers of humans 
under controlled conditions. 
By contrast, the mid-twentieth century model of medical device 
development was one of product “design.”137 Because devices are 
designed, the site, mechanism, and nature of their actions—and hence 
their risks—were viewed as predictable. Thus, when Congress enacted the 
Medical Device Amendments in 1976, it created a tiered pre-market 
evaluation system in which the FDA sorts devices into high, intermediate, 
and low risk categories based on information about device function, 
composition, design, and intended use, all of which are available before 
any human exposure.138 
Under these twentieth-century views, a large information deficit exists 
regarding the risks posed by all new drugs, while a much smaller 
information deficit exists for new medical devices. The remaining two 
sources of information are used in a calibrated fashion to overcome these 
information deficits. For new drugs, the regulatory system uses a two-
layered approach that ensures maximal information production and 
dissemination.139 The first layer of regulation is the federal pre-market 
NDA process. But even Phase 3 clinical trials cannot identify all 
significant new drug risks, and thus, new drugs enter the market with 
many unknown risks. State tort and products liability law serve as a 
second layer of regulation that forces the production and dissemination of 
risk information as very large numbers of people are exposed to a new drug. 
For generic drugs, the regulatory system uses a single layered approach 
that requires the production of far less information about risk.140 But 
                                                     
136. Id. 
137. See, e.g., Fred B. Hovey, Therapeutic Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, 3 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 97, 97 (1948) (“The properties of drugs . . . are not obvious on ocular 
inspection . . . but the properties of most . . . therapeutic devices are obvious, and the need 
for . . . warnings regarding their uses and dangers is not apparent.”). 
138. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 888.3310 (2019) (classifying hip prostheses as a Class II device based 
on function (“prevents [hip] dislocation in more than one anatomic plane”), composition (“femoral 
component made of alloys, such as cobalt-chromium-molybdenum”), and intended use (“to replace a 
hip joint”)). 
139. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 579 (2009) (noting FDA’s earlier position that state law 
provides an additional layer of protection against drug risks); Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra note 
10, at 1613–14. 
140. See Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012)); Jordan 
Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A Case Study of the FDA 
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generic drugs arrive at the FDA for evaluation with an extensive quantum 
of risk information. First, there is the information generated by the 
manufacturer of the NDA-approved drug of which the generic drug is a 
copy. Further, by the time a generic drug enters the market, very large 
numbers of people will likely have been exposed to the brand version for 
a long period of time, providing additional risk information that mitigates 
the deficits with which new drug entered the market. Post-market failure-
to-warn liability would in theory provide little added risk information. 
For medical devices, the information deficits are smaller at the outset. 
Device risk can be sorted into categories based on knowledge of device 
function, composition, design, and intended use, all of which are available 
before any human exposure.141 The rationale for human studies arises less 
from the need to identify and quantify unforeseeable risks and more from 
the need to verify that known risks have been adequately addressed by the 
manufacturer’s design and labeling choices. The smaller information 
deficits (relative to the information deficit for new drugs) about high-risk 
device risk can be addressed using a less extensive and less rigorous pre-
market evaluation process. Once this evaluation has been completed, state 
failure-to-warn actions would in theory provide little additional risk 
information relative to the burdens that allowing such actions would impose. 
For intermediate risk (Class II) devices, the regulatory system also uses 
a singled-layered approach to information production.142 Federal regulation 
through the Section 510(k) clearance process does not require the 
generation of new risk information. This leaves a small information deficit 
that state tort and products liability law can, in some cases, mitigate. 
The overall system of regulation, including federal and state regulation 
of drugs and devices, thus functions as a mechanism that imposes a 
calibrated set of obligations on manufacturers to generate and disclose 
information about product risk.143 Before proceeding, three important 
qualifications to this account must be addressed. The first qualification is 
that the account is intended as a functional description; it is not intended 
to imply that the system was designed solely or even primarily to ensure 
that information production and dissemination match the information 
needed to ensure product safety. Although ensuring safety has been a 
primary goal, calibrating information requirements across new drugs, 
generic drugs, high risk devices, and intermediate risk devices was not at 
the top of any decision-maker’s priorities. 
                                                     
and Implications for Nanobiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 598, 601 & n.28 (2009). 
141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
142. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996). 
143. See Cahoy, supra note 27, at 629; Laakman, supra note 27, at 138. 
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Many other policy considerations have informed the individual choices 
by Congress, the FDA, and the courts. Information production was key to 
Congress’s creation of the FDA pre-market evaluation processes, but the 
structure of these processes balanced many competing policy goals. 
Congress permitted intermediate-risk device manufacturers to market 
their devices with the minimal information required by Section 510(k) 
notification so that existing devices did not have to be withdrawn from the 
market pending PMA evaluation and to avoid conferring an unfair 
competitive advantage on manufacturers with devices already on the 
market.144 State courts expanded the reach of their tort and products 
liability laws between the 1950s and 1970s based on principles such as 
deterrence, cost spreading, and “reduc[ing] the hazards to life and health 
in defective products.”145 The U.S. Supreme Court, in finding that FDA 
approval of generic drugs preempts state law failure-to-warn claims, 
recognized Congress’s policy goal of lowering prescription drug prices.146 
And in finding that FDA approval of high-risk medical devices through 
the PMA process preempts state law claims, the Court recognized that 
nationally uniform regulation would promote the development of new 
device technologies.147 This Article’s claim, therefore, is not that federal 
and state regulation of drugs and devices can be described as a system 
designed ab initio, but rather as an emergent, functional system of 
calibrated information-forcing obligations. 
The second qualification recognizes the asymmetries between the 
information-forcing capabilities of the FDA premarket evaluation 
processes and state tort and product liability law. The federal NDA 
process, the PMA process, and (through incorporation of information 
generated by the reference brand drug) the ANDA process all result in the 
reliable production of risk information. The one exception is the Section 
510(k) notification process, which results in little to no information about 
risk. By contrast, the quantity and quality of information produced by tort 
and product liability law is much less certain. 
Anecdotal claims for the information-forcing function of tort and 
product liability law abound. Tort and products liability actions have been 
credited with forcing information about previously undisclosed product 
                                                     
144. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 449, 486 n.172 (2008). 
145. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Trainor, J., 
concurring). 
146. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 612–13 (2011). 
147. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008); see infra notes 160–178 and 
accompanying text. 
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risks into the public’s awareness in contexts as varied as automotive 
defects,148 handgun safety,149 and prescription drugs.150 But the utility of 
tort and products liability actions as information-forcing mechanisms is 
controversial in general and vulnerable to powerful criticisms in the drug 
and device context.151 In fact, many of the anecdotes crediting tort and 
product liability actions with forcing the disclosure of risk information for 
certain drugs break down on closer inspection. 
Merck’s withdrawal of its blockbuster anti-inflammatory pain reliever, 
Vioxx, is one of the most frequently cited success stories for information-
forcing through tort and product liability law. Merck withdrew the drug 
on September 29, 2004, after the Data Safety Monitoring Board of an 
ongoing study found an increased risk of stroke and heart attack.152 By 
August, 2001, sufficient data had been published in the peer-reviewed 
medical literature to permit researchers at the Cleveland Clinic to 
conclude that use of COX-2 inhibitors, including Vioxx, increased the risk 
of myocardial infarction.153 The earliest products liability cases were filed 
after this date.154 Similarly, commentators have credited a lawsuit filed in 
August 2001 with forcing the manufacturer of the antidepressant drug 
Paxil to add warnings to the label cautioning that the drug could be habit 
forming.155 The label change came three months after the suit was filed. 
However, clear evidence of a withdrawal-like syndrome on termination of 
treatment had been extensively presented in the medical literature by the 
mid-1990s.156 In fact, the manufacturer’s requests to change the Paxil 
                                                     
148. Nora F. Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 293, 328–32 (2018). 
149. Wendy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems & the Regulatory Benefits of Gun Litigation, 
in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 
271, 271 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2009). 
150. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 95, at 309. 
151. Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction: An Overview of Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, in 
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 1, 
24 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2009); Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t 
Work, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS 
TORTS 1, 233 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2009). 
152. FDA, FDA Public Health Advisory: Safety of Vioxx (2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/u
cm106274.htm [http://perma.cc/5NBF-MQWM].  
153. See generally Debabrata Mukherjee, Steven E. Nissen & Eric J. Topol, Risk of Cardiovascular 
Events Associated with Selective COX-2 Inhibitors, 286 JAMA 954 (2001) (summarizing available 
clinical evidence of Vioxx risks). 
154. See, e.g., Lauderdale v. Merck & Co., No. 1:01CV418D-B, 2002 WL 449423, at *1 (N.D. 
Miss. Feb. 4, 2002) (earliest locatable claim against Merck over cardiovascular risks of Vioxx). 
155. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 95, at 310. 
156. A PubMed search (using search terms “paroxetine” and “withdrawal”) revealed numerous 
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label came in response to an FDA action letter sent in January 2000.157 
Again, the information about the drug’s dangers was clearly available to 
the medical community and the FDA long before litigation reached the 
discovery phase. 
But tort and product liability law are not devoid of information-forcing 
capabilities. Even in the cases just discussed, the actions may have 
brought the information that was already known about product risk into 
the awareness of a broader population and may have focused the FDA’s 
and the manufacturers’ attention on the risks. And beyond the specific 
information that may be forced in an individual case, state law actions 
may serve as a general incentive for manufacturers to disclose information 
about product risk. 
The third qualification to note is that this account is incomplete in that 
it does not consider the full gamut of regulatory inputs that lead to 
information generation and disclosure. Drug and device manufacturers are 
obligated to report certain adverse events to the FDA, and the agency has 
the authority to require post-market clinical studies for some products.158 
Independent researchers may study drugs and devices even after their 
approval. Clinical experience accrues over time and is shared through 
formal and informal information networks.159 
Recognizing that the account of medical product regulation is 
descriptive, that it may somewhat overstate the efficacy of state common 
law actions to force information, and that it is incomplete, the next section 
turns to the Supreme Court’s role in creating the medical product 
regulatory system. 
D. The Supreme Court’s Role in Creating the Medical Product 
Regulatory System 
The Supreme Court has played a key role in determining the contours 
of this calibrated system by determining the role of state regulation 
through its preemption holdings. In contrast to other accounts of the 
Court’s preemption holdings in the drug and device cases, the 
information-forcing account presented here provides a comprehensive 
                                                     
case studies, literature reviews, and expert opinions by 1996. 
157. See Letter from Russel Katz, Dir., Div. of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, to Susan Weill, Assoc. 
Dir., U.S. Regulatory Affairs (2002), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2002/20982ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ42-JZHF]. 
158. JOHNSON 2016, supra note 3, at 27.  
159. Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanism for Regulating Off-Label 
Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 389–91 (2014). 
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explanation of the outcomes in Lohr, Buckman, Riegel, Wyeth, PLIVA, 
and Mutual Pharmaceutical. The Court itself has explained its preemption 
holdings as implementing statutes that embody Congress’s policies 
relating to safety, cost-containment, the promotion of innovation through 
national regulatory uniformity, and competitive fairness.160 But many of 
these considerations have been mentioned only to explain the holding for 
the case in which they are invoked, ignoring the fact that the same 
considerations are germane to other cases in which they would point to a 
different outcome. Concerns that tort and products liability verdicts may 
drive up costs support preempting tort and products liability claims 
against generic drug manufacturers, but these same concerns would also 
support preempting all claims against the manufacturers of Section 510(k) 
cleared devices, which are far more common than PMA-approved 
devices.161 A policy of promoting innovation by establishing a 
nationwide, uniform regulatory environment supports preempting claims 
against the manufacturers of high-risk, PMA-approved devices, but that 
policy would also support preempting claims against the developers of 
new drugs and intermediate-risk devices. Thus, none of these explanations 
can fully account for the complex, nuanced preemption landscape that 
currently exists in the medical products context. 
A full discussion of scholars’ efforts to understand the Court’s 
preemption decisions is beyond the scope of this Article. But several 
general themes—often overlapping—emerge from this literature. One 
general theme focuses on sub rosa changes to preemption doctrine in 
which the Court is said to be in the process of implementing. Since the 
Court’s 1947 decision in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,162 courts have 
at least nominally and at least in many cases applied a presumption against 
preemption.163 But many scholars argue that the Supreme Court has 
tacitly inverted preemption doctrine, so that the Court now applies a 
presumption in favor of preemption.164And some have argued that the 
                                                     
160. Id.; PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 626 (2011); Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 478 (1996). 
161. JOHNSON 2016,  supra note 3, at 4 (showing that 35% of devices were marketed through a 
Section 510(k) notification compared with 1% through PMA-approval). 
162. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
163. Id. at 230 (“[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). 
164. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When it Matters: A Different Approach to 
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1319 (2004) (“The only way to make sense of the [Geier] case 
is to see it as putting a presumption in favor of preemption.”); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the 
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S. C. L. REV. 967, 1013 (2002) (arguing that the Court’s 
“preemption rules lead[] to the application of an implicit presumption in favor of preemption”); 
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Court has implicitly abandoned its stated approach, in which it 
discretely analyzes express and implied preemption, and now conducts 
either “a veiled implied preemption analysis” in express preemption 
cases165 or applies a “unitary standard, merging previously discrete 
analytical elements into a single process.”166 The unitary standard 
argument holds that the Court’s preemption analysis is actually “a 
single integrated process containing multiple factors.”167 Taken to an 
extreme, this argument sees a danger that each preemption decision 
becomes “an ad hoc federalism analysis open to over-reliance on 
policy judgments and broad judicial discretion.”168 
A second general theme focuses on the critical attitudes of some of the 
Justices toward tort and product liability law.169 Commentators posit a 
variety of factors—an “onslaught . . . of reports about excessive tort 
liability and run-away jury verdicts”170 in the 1990s, “value choices to limit 
civil rights laws and to protect business,”171 and concerns about non-uniform 
regulatory environments—that may have influenced some Justices. But 
whatever the origins, many believe that the Court has grown increasingly 
hostile to common law litigation in the consumer products context. 
A third general theme postulates various agendas that at least some 
of the Justices seek to implement. Focusing on the products liability cases, 
Professor Catherine Sharkey notes that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito, Scalia, and Thomas have sought to “rein in agencies’ authoritative 
power by curtailing [the Chevron and Auer] doctrines that accord 
deference to agency interpretations of statutes and regulations.”172 But in 
addition to hostility toward the administrative state, these same justices 
have also expressed hostility toward state tort and products liability law.173 
Sharkey argues that “the object of vilification is regulation itself, whether 
                                                     
Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2011) (“Watters 
v. Wachovia Bank appeared to apply a presumption [in favor] of preemption.”). 
165. See Davis, supra note 164, at 1004. 
166. Jean M. Eggen, The Mature Product Preemption Doctrine: The Unitary Standard and the 
Paradox of Consumer Protection, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 95, 97 (2009). 
167. Id. at 134. 
168. Id. at 144. 
169. Davis, supra note 164, at 1009 (“[T]he Court’s distrust of products liability actions is greater 
than its interest in determining congressional intent or preserving traditional state authority.”). 
170. Id. at 1017. 
171. Chemerinsky, supra note 164, at 1315. 
172. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law: Regulatory Substitutes 
or Complements?, 65 EMORY L.J. 1705, 1709 (2016). 
173. Id. at 1708–09. 
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by agency or common law.”174 Preemption is thus simply one piece of a 
larger anti-regulatory, pro-business agenda. 
Professors Lee Epstein and William Landes, and Judge Richard 
Posner examined the pro-business explanation empirically.175 Using a 
database of Supreme Court cases between 1946 and 2011 in which at least 
one party at oral argument was a business, they found that the Roberts 
Court more frequently granted certiorari in cases where a business lost in 
the lower court and reversed those lower court decisions more often than 
either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts had.176 Further, when the business 
entity had won below, the Roberts Court affirmed more frequently than 
its predecessors had.177 Looking at the level of individual Justices, they 
found that “five of the ten Justices who . . . have been the most favorable 
to business are currently serving.”178 
These broad analyses of the Supreme Court’s preemption 
jurisprudence provide possible explanations for the decisions in the 
drug and device cases. But their descriptive value for the overall 
system of regulation for medical products described in section I.C is 
limited. In particular, these accounts encounter difficulties explaining 
the residual role that is left to the states after the Lohr, Buckman, 
Riegel, Wyeth, PLIVA, and Mutual Pharmaceutical decisions. State 
failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturers of NDA-approved 
brand drugs will likely survive preemption defenses, as may failure-
to-warn and design defect claims that can be plead as parallel claims 
against the manufacturers of intermediate risk, Section 510(k)-cleared 
devices in many circuits. Explanations based on a strong presumption 
in favor of preemption or on a widely held dissatisfaction with state 
tort and product liability actions face difficulties when applied to Lohr 
and Wyeth. Likewise, explanations based on a pro-business deregulatory 
agenda or the use of a tacit presumption in favor of preemption suggest 
that all state law claims against drug and device manufacturers should be 
preempted. Thus, none of these explanations can account for the complex, 
                                                     
174. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Anti-Deference Pro-Preemption Paradox at the U.S. Supreme 
Court: The Business Community Weighs in, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 805, 806, 809 (2017) (listing 
other scholars who have argued that the Roberts Court’s decisions embody a pro-business, anti-
regulatory agenda). 
175. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme 
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1471 (2013). 
176. Id. at 1472. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. But see Michael S. Greve et al., Preemption in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: An 
Empirical Analysis, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 353, 385 (2015) (concluding based on empirical analysis 
that an explanation for the Roberts Court’s preemption case outcomes “must be sought in doctrine, 
rather than raw ideology”). 
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nuanced preemption landscape that currently exists in the medical 
products context. 
The information-forcing account set out here offers a description of 
medical products regulation by the FDA and state failure-to-warn actions 
that is more comprehensive than these other accounts. The information-
forcing account considers all three sources of risk information to explain 
the application of federal and state regulatory inputs to new drugs, generic 
drugs, high-risk devices, and intermediate-risk devices. This information-
forcing account also provides the normative position taken in this Article, 
which is that a regulatory system that calibrates manufacturers’ 
obligations to produce and disseminate information about product risk to 
the existing information about risk is desirable as a policy matter. 
II. THE REGULATORY GAP IN COMBINATION PRODUCTS 
REGULATION 
A developing regulatory gap threatens to subvert the calibrated 
information-forcing mechanism described in section I.C. This gap allows 
certain new drugs to reach patients without undergoing the rigorous 
information-forcing premarket NDA evaluation (instead reaching the 
market through the PMA process) and without being subjected to 
information-forcing post-market state law actions. The regulatory gap is 
the result of a “new” type of medical product—combination products—
especially those that consist of a new drug and a high-risk medical 
device.179 Congress created the federal side of this gap in 1990.180 The 
state side of the gap, however, has emerged only recently, through lower 
courts’ preemption decisions. Part II.A provides an introduction to 
combination products and the risks they may present. Part II.B then uses 
an extensive line of cases involving the “Infuse Bone Graft/Lt-Cage 
Lumbar Tapered Fusion” combination product (“Infuse/LT-Cage 
product”) to illustrate the regulatory gap. 
A. Combination Products: A Primer 
FDA regulations define combination products as products composed of 
two or more of the traditional, non-combination product categories, “i.e., 
drug/device, biologic/device, drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic,” 
                                                     
179. “Combination products” are defined as products that consist of more than one product type, 
that is, some combination of a drug and device, a biologic and a device, a drug and a biologic, or a 
drug and a device and a biologic. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (2019). 
180. See infra Part III.  
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which may be combined into a single entity, packaged together, or 
packaged separately but labeled for use with one-another.181 Regulating 
combination products poses difficult challenges for the FDA, given that 
regulating each of the constituents requires specialized expertise.182 This 
Article focuses on combination products that include a medical device, 
which raises the additional challenge of determining the appropriate role 
of state tort and product liability actions.183 Section II.A.1 discusses how 
combination products form an increasingly large portion of all products 
that are in use today, and will continue to grow in importance relative to 
the traditional, non-combination products over the foreseeable future. 
Section II.A.2 then explains why predicting the risks of a combination 
product is more difficult than for other products, including non-
combination new drugs. 
1. The Range and Growth of the Combination Products Category 
The FDA has approved a wide array of drug-device combination 
products. These include: 
▪ The Infuse/LT-Cage product. This product is used to fuse 
adjacent vertebrae in the spines of patients with low back pain 
due to degenerative disc disease.184 
▪ Drug eluting stents, which consist of a stent device—a metal 
mesh tube that physically holds open a narrowed artery—
which is coated by a drug.185 
▪ Implantable, battery-powered pump devices, which can deliver 
drugs, such as insulin, on an ongoing basis or to specific 
regions in the body.186 
▪ Smart pills, which combine a drug and a miniaturized 
transmitter allowing patients and their physicians to monitor 
                                                     
181. 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e). 
182. See, e.g., Foote & Berlin, supra note 4, at 620; Paradise et al., supra note 66, at 602. 
183. Because most of the relevant biologics are regulated by the FDA’s drug authorities, drugs and 
biologics are treated together in this Article. 
184. FDA, SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DATA: MEDTRONIC INFUSE, PMA NUMBER 
P000058 (2002), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf/P000058b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F8QJ-DVAK]. 
185. FDA, HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: ABILIFY MYCITE (2018), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2017/207202lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS48-7S4T].  
186. See FDA, PREMARKET APPROVAL, PMA P800036 (2018), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma.cfm?id=P800036 
[https://perma.cc/RQL8-CS8H]. The Infusaid Implantable Insulin Pump was first approved as a 
Class III medical device in 1982, before the legal definition of combination product existed. Id. The 
pump is currently classified as a combination product. Id. 
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compliance with a prescribed antipsychotic drug regimen.187 
▪ Transdermal patches, which deliver a drug at a consistent rate 
through the skin for hours or days.188 
Drug-device combinations form an important and growing part of the 
current-day medical treatment armamentarium. Premarket evaluation of 
these products now accounts for a significant portion of the FDA’s time 
and effort.189 Between 2000 and 2002, fewer than 1% of all PMA 
approvals were for combination products; in the two most recent years for 
which data is available, 16% of all PMA approvals have been for 
combination products.190 Combination products submitted for approval 
through the FDA’s drug and biological product pathways demonstrate a 
similar pattern, with steady increases between 2012 and 2015.191 
Many observers have suggested that combination products will soon be 
the largest category of products submitted to the FDA.192 Industry analysts 
estimate that as many as one-third of all products in development are 
combination products.193 These products include more sophisticated smart 
                                                     
187. Yieyie Yang, The First FDA Approval of a Drug-device Combination Product that Tracks Patients’ 
Ingestion of Medication, FINNEGAN (Nov. 13, 2007), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/ip-fda-
blog/the-first-fda-approval-of-a-drug-device-combination-product-that-tracks-patients-ingestion-of-
medication.html [https://perma.cc/Y36T-DEDT] (explaining that the label describes the product as a drug-
device combination product “comprised of aripiprazole tablets embedded with an Ingestible Event Marker 
(IEM)”); Letter from Mitchell V. Mathis, Dir., Div. of Psychiatry Products, to Michael Fahmy, Dir., Global 
Regulatory Affairs, (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2017/207202
Orig1s000ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC4X-5X22]. Contact with gastric acid powers a transmitter whose signal 
is detected by a wearable monitor that links to a cell-phone. See Yang, supra note 182. 
188. Michael N. Pastore et al., Transdermal Patches: History, Development and Pharmacology, 
172 BRITISH J. PHARMACOLOGY 2179, 2180 (2015). 
189. See FDA, FY 2016 PERFORMANCE REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE OFFICE OF COMBINATION 
PRODUCTS 13, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/Combin
ationProducts/UCM606678.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UCE-DWJ8] (documenting 357 new combination 
products approval submissions). 
190. This is derived from data publicly available on the FDA PMA Approval website. I searched 
all FDA PMA approvals from the FDA website and constructed a spreadsheet that facilitated the 
calculation of the number of PMA approvals each year. See Premarket Approval (PMA), FDA (May 
16, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-approval-pma 
[https://perma.cc/T623-9ZFN]. I then repeated this process but limited the search to combination 
products. I then constructed a ratio of total PMA approvals to combination product approvals by 
CDRH each year. In 2016 CDRH granted a total of 2,563 PMA approvals, of which 414 (16.2%) 
were combination products; in 2017 the numbers were 2,718 and 422, respectively (15.5%). Id.  
191. See FY 2016 PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 189, at 11. In 2015, the majority of 
combination products were submitted to CDER (53%), followed by CDRH (36%) and CBER (11%). Id. 
192. See, e.g., SHAYNE C. GAD & SAMANTHA GAD-MCDONALD, BIOMATERIALS, MEDICAL 
DEVICES, AND COMBINATION PRODUCTS: BIOCOMPATIBILITY TESTING AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
387, 388 tbl.17.1 (2015); Foote & Berlin, supra note 4, at 620–21; Mark Lavender, Regulating 
Innovative Medicine: Fitting Square Pegs in Round Holes, 1 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 4 (2005). 
193. Drues, supra note 34. 
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pills, which will deliver a drug in a user-controlled manner;194 anticancer 
drugs coated by a sphere of lipid molecules, which will permit higher 
doses to be administered to a tumor while limiting toxicity to the rest of 
the body195; and cultured human cells mounted onto a physical matrix for 
implantation, which can restore damaged regions of the body.196 The 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) is currently funding a variety of 
studies that could lead to the development of technologies that will be 
implemented as combination products.197 
This shift toward the development of combination products by the 
medical products industry will likely be accompanied by a shift toward 
the use of such products by health care providers. Combination products 
may be more effective than non-combination products.198 And 
combination products may reduce certain risks posed by non-combination 
products.199 As the shift to combination product development and use 
progresses, increasing numbers of patients will be exposed to combination 
products. With this increase, more injuries related to combination products 
will occur, and the portion of injuries arising from combination products will 
rise relative to injuries arising from non-combination products. 
2. Synergistic Risks of Combination Products: Challenging the 
Scientific Capacity to Predict Risk 
Every drug-device combination product poses a spectrum of risks, only 
some of which are foreseeable. The ability to predict the risks of a 
combination product raises the same considerations that are relevant to 
the individual constituents. Specifically, the risks posed by a new drug 
incorporated into a combination product may be as unforeseeable as the 
risks posed by the same new drug used by itself. Although some risks may 
be reduced, as where an active drug is encapsulated in a lipid coating or 
selectively delivered to a localized site, new-drug risks can neither be 
                                                     
194. See Matthew Avery & Dan Liu, Bringing Smart Pills to Market: FDA Regulation of Ingestible 
Drug/Device Combination Products, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 329, 332–34 (2011). 
195. Sophie Marchal et al., Anticancer Drug Delivery: An Update on Clinically Applied 
Nanotherapeutics, 75 DRUGS 1601, 1604 fig.1 (2015). 
196. See Lichun Lu et al., Tissue Engineered Constructs: Perspectives on Clinical Translation, 43 
ANNALS BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 796, 796 (2015); Catarina Medeira, Advanced Cell Therapies 
for Articular Cartilage Regeneration, 33 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY. 35, 36 fig.1 (2015). 
197. See Delivery Systems and Devices for Drugs and Biologics, NAT’L INST. BIOMEDICAL 
IMAGING & BIOENGINEERING, https://www.nibib.nih.gov/research-funding/drug-and-gene-delivery-
systems-and-devices [https://perma.cc/K5NV-48WG] (listing sixty-five funded studies in the 
“Funded Projects” tab). 
198. See supra notes 185–195 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra note 195. 
 
10 - Horvath.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2019  10:49 AM 
2019] EMERGENT REGULATORY SYSTEMS 1731 
 
completely foreseen nor eliminated.200 Thus, drug-device combination 
products arrive for FDA premarket evaluation with very large deficits in 
information because of the presence of a new drug. 
Further, combining a drug and a device may create risks that exceed 
the arithmetic sum of the risks of the individual products. These risks, 
referred to as “synergistic”201 or “superadditive”202 risks, are not unique 
to combination products. Drug-drug combinations203 may pose risks that 
are quantitatively greater than the risks of each drug alone. For example, 
the risk of central nervous system depression caused by a combination of 
an alcohol and a benzodiazepine (e.g., Valium) exceeds the additive risk 
of respiratory depression by each drug used by itself.204 These quantitative 
synergistic risks are well-known to clinicians and to regulators. Phase 
three clinical trials are designed in part to evaluate these risks. 
Less commonly, drug-drug combinations may present risks which 
neither individual drug component presents. Neither the antidepressant 
drug Paxil nor the cholesterol-lowering drug Pravachol has been shown 
to raise blood glucose levels, but patients who use both are at an increased 
risk for elevated blood glucose levels,205 which can be devastating for 
those who are already treated for diabetes.206 These types of qualitative 
synergistic risks are more difficult to predict than quantitative synergistic 
risks. Even large, rigorous Phase 3 clinical trials have failed to identify 
some of these risks.207 
Combination products present synergistic risks as well. Some of these 
risks are quantitative. Both an injection catheter and a drug carry the risk 
                                                     
200. Avery & Liu, supra note 194, at 331 (describing how controlled delivery of certain drugs can 
reduce their toxicity). 
201. FDA, ISO 10993-1, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
STAFF 34 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/85865/download [https://perma.cc/W3EN-D9VG] 
(discussing appropriate testing to detect “synergistic mechanisms”). 
202. Jennifer B. Treweek, Amanda J. Roberts & Kim D. Janda, Superadditive Effects of Ethanol 
and Flunitrazepam: Implications of Using Immunopharmacotherapy as a Therapeutic, 7 
MOLECULAR PHARMACOLOGY 2056, 2058 (2010) (discussing the “superadditive effects” of ethanol 
and benzodiazepines on the central nervous system). 
203. Drug-drug combinations do not satisfy the definition of a combination product, because the 
components are both from the same product category. 
204. Treweek, Roberts & Janda, supra note 202, at 2058. 
205. NP Tatonetti et al., Detecting Drug Interactions from Adverse-Event Reports: Interaction 
Between Paroxetine and Pravastatin Increases Blood Glucose Levels, 90 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 
& THERAPEUTICS 133, 133 (July 2011). 
206. See Feng Li et al., Co-Administration of Paroxetine and Pravastatin Causes Deregulation of 
Glucose Homeostasis in Diabetic Rats via Enhanced Paroxetine Exposure, 35 ACTA 
PHARMACOLOGICA SINICA 792, 792–93 (2014). 
207. The Paxil-Pravachol interaction was only identified through post-market data mining. Id. 
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irritating the tissue at the injection site, even where the injection is very 
brief. Where an infusion pump uses an indwelling catheter to inject a drug 
to a site for a prolonged period of time, the risk of irritation and its 
magnitude, should it occur, are larger.208 But the existence of these risks 
is foreseeable, because they are posed by the individual constituents of the 
combination product. 
More concerning are the qualitative synergistic risks posed by 
combination products. Cases involving drug-eluting stents209 are 
illustrative. Drug-eluting stents were developed because coronary arteries 
opened with “bare metal” stent devices tended to become obstructed 
within weeks to a few months as the cells that form the innermost layer of 
the artery began to divide and grow rapidly in a process called neo-intimal 
hyperplasia.210 Combining an antiproliferative drug, which prevents cell 
growth, with a stent device prevents neo-intimal hyperplasia, resulting in 
superior rates of artery patency.211 Paclitaxel, or Taxol, is one of the 
antiproliferative drugs that was used in the first generation of drug eluting 
stents.212 By itself, Paclitaxel is associated with a very low risk of arterial 
thrombosis, and is not associated with thrombosis occurring late (such as 
months to years) after drug administration.213 Likewise, “bare metal 
stents,” stents without the antiproliferative coating, had not been 
associated with late thrombosis.214 But the first generation drug-eluting 
stent that used Taxol (the “Taxus”) was found to have a risk of late-
occurring in-stent thrombosis, which was associated with a high mortality 
rate.215 This risk was unexpected: neither constituent alone was associated 
                                                     
208. Cf. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (describing 
paralysis resulting from drug infusion via an indwelling catheter that resulted from tissue irritation). 
209. See supra notes 182–192 and accompanying text. 
210. Edoardo Camenzind, P. Gabriel Steg & William Wijns, Stent Thrombosis Late After 
Implantation of First-Generation Drug-Eluting Stents; A Cause for Concern, 115 CIRCULATION 
1440, 1440 (2007). 
211. Id. 
212. Camenzind, Steg & Wijns, supra note 210, at 1440. 
213. See FDA, DRUGS@FDA: FDA APPROVED PRODUCTS, NDA 020262 (1992) (discussing FDA 
labeling, which does not mention arterial thrombosis). Like FDA labeling, the medical literature does 
not contain reports of an increased risk of arterial thrombosis: I performed a search of the medical 
literature using the NIH’s PubMed search engine on May 29, 2018, using the keywords “paclitaxel” 
and “thrombosis” and “NOT stent.” See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Nat’l Inst. of Health, PUBMED, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ [https://perma.cc/JZ2Q-89LC]. PubMed returned no relevant 
hits. 
214. Camenzind, Steg & Wijns, supra note 210, at 1440. But see Kyohei Yamaji et al., Bare Metal 
Stent Thrombosis and In-Stent Neoatherosclerosis, 5 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR 
INTERVENTIONS 47, 47–48 (2012) (citing a 0.1% risk of very late thrombosis in bare metal stents). 
215. Camenzind, Steg & Wijns, supra note 210, at 1440, 1443. 
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with late-occurring thrombosis, and even the pivotal study on which the 
FDA based the Taxus’s approval failed to identify this risk.216 
Although the FDA and the scientific and clinical communities have 
decades of experience in identifying and evaluating risk synergies, this 
experience is mainly for quantitative synergies within specific product 
categories (for instance, drug-drug products). By contrast, combination 
products involve potential synergies created by different product types. 
As the drug-eluting stent example shows, combination products may be 
more likely to present risks that are qualitatively different from those 
presented by the individual constituents. The FDA and the scientific 
community have far less experience in identifying and characterizing 
these synergies.217 
As the discussion in this Section has demonstrated, combination 
products comprise a large and growing portion of all medical products, 
and their risks are unforeseeable. How should the calibrated regulatory 
system described in section I.C treat them? Given the presence of a new 
drug and the problem of qualitative synergistic risks, one would expect 
the federal layer of regulation to occur through the NDA process, with its 
robust information-forcing obligations. Further, one would expect the 
state layer of regulation to function as it does in regard to new drugs. But, 
as the next section demonstrates, neither of these has been the case. 
B. Aaron v. Medtronic Inc. and the Regulatory Gap 
The approval process for, injuries caused by, and litigation surrounding 
Medtronic’s InFUSE/LT-CAGE combination product illustrate many 
aspects of the regulatory gap. This product is used to fuse adjacent vertebrae 
in the spines of patients with low back pain due to degenerative disk 
disease.218 The product consists of a device, a thimble-shaped metallic cage, 
and a drug, recombinant bone morphogenic protein (rhBMP-2).219 The cage 
                                                     
216. See FDA, P030025, SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DATA: TAXUS EXPRESS 
CORONARY STENT SYSTEM 19 tbl.9 (2004), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf3/P03002 
5B.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9ML-UHVF]. 
217. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR INNOVATIVE COMBINATION PRODUCTS 2 (2006), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126054.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/45HX-CHR9] (“[A]lthough a combination product may be comprised of an already 
approved drug and an already approved device, new scientific and technical issues may emerge when 
the drug and device are combined or used together.”). 
218. FDA, PMA NO. P000058, SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DATA (2002), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf/P000058b.pdf [https://perma.cc/35VL-X6RF]. 
219. See Aaron v. Medtronic, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 994, 998 (S.D. Ohio 2016); supra note 220, at 1. 
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holds the drug in place and “maintains the proper height between the 
vertebrae.”220 The rhBMP-2 promotes bone growth which fuses the 
adjacent vertebrae, stabilizing the spine.221 Since 2013, thousands of 
plaintiffs have filed suits seeking compensation for physical injuries alleged 
to have arisen from the use of the InFUSE/LT-CAGE product. 
At the time Medtronic sought FDA approval, the InFUSE/LT-CAGE 
appeared to offer a significant advantage over the traditional approach, 
which required surgeons to harvest bone fragments from the patient’s hip 
bone. Once implanted into the area of the degenerated disk, the bone 
fragments stimulated bone growth that stabilized the spine. The rhBMP-2 
constituent stimulated spinal bone grown, eliminating the need for the 
painful harvesting procedure. 
When Medtronic submitted the InFUSE/LT-CAGE combination 
product for approval, the rhBMP-2 constituent had not previously been 
subjected to the NDA process.222 Thus, the drug constituent and the 
combination product as a whole arrived at the FDA with the large deficit 
in information regarding risk that accompanies most new drugs. 
Nonetheless, the FDA approved rhBMP-2, along with the other 
constituents of the InFUSE/LT-CAGE product, through the PMA process. 
This decision was within the agency’s statutory authority.223 But the 
decision perpetuated the information deficit because the FDA required 
Medtronic to generate less information about risk than an NDA approval 
would have required. Many other recombinant drugs, which had been 
approved through the NDA process, were supported by multiple, large, 
randomized, blinded clinical trials involving thousands of patients. For 
example, Novo/Nordisk obtained NDA approval for its diabetes drug, 
                                                     
220. Fact Sheet, Medtronic, Inc., INFUSE® Bone Graft/LT-CAGE® Lumbar Tapered Fusion 
Device (2013), http://www.medtronic.com/content/dam/medtronic-com/us-en/newsroom/media-
resources/media-kits/infuse-bone-graft-lt-cage-device/documents/medtronic-infuse-bone-graft-lt-
cage-lumbar-tapered-fusion-device-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RNJ-RXFJ]. The product also 
includes a biological constituent (a collagen matrix) that acts as a scaffold for the rhBMP-2. Id. at 2. 
221. See Kevin S. Cahill et al., Am. Med. Ass’n, Prevalence, Complications, and Hospital Charges 
Associated with Use of Bone-Morphogenetic Proteins in Spinal Fusion Procedures, 302 JAMA 58, 
58–59 (2009). 
222. Nor had rhBMP-2 been approved by any other regulatory body in the world. See Infuse Bone 
Graft, MEDTRONIC, https://global.medtronic.com/xg-en/e/response/infuse-bone-graft.html 
[https://perma.cc/H9NP-43GS] (noting that the first approval was by the FDA in 2002). The FDA 
first approved the InFUSE/LT-CAGE product on July 2, 2002. See Premarket Approval (PMA), FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-approval-pma 
[[https://perma.cc/3EEX-P2YP]. The European Medicines Agency approved the product under the 
name Inductos on September 9, 2002. See Inductos, EUR. MEDS. AGENCY (2005), 
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/human/EPAR/inductos#authorisation-details-section 
[https://perma.cc/TQ5L-PW73].   
223. See infra section III.A. 
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Victoza, based on human studies, which included “[a] total of 3978 
patients . . . in 5 double-blind . . . . randomized, controlled clinical 
trials.”224 By contrast, the human data supporting rhBMP-2 consisted of a 
pilot study involving fourteen subjects and a single, non-randomized, non-
blinded pivotal study of 427 subjects.225 
The InFUSE/LT-CAGE product—based on the data required by the 
PMA process—did not appear to carry an increased risk of serious 
harm.226 But since its approval on July 2, 2002, the product has caused 
excessive bone growth in the spines of many patients, compressing the 
nearby nerves and resulting in intractable pain, paralysis, incontinence, 
and a host of other devastating complications.227 In 2011, The Spine 
Journal published the results of a systematic review of the medical 
literature and associated documents on rhBMP-2, which led the 
investigators to conclude that the original pilot and pivotal trials were 
inadequate to assess safety and marred by conflicts of interest.228 A review 
of subsequent publications suggested that the rate of adverse events 
ranged between 10% and 50%.229 
The information deficits concerning the risks of rhBMP-2, which 
resulted from approval through the PMA process, might have been offset 
by tort and products liability failure-to-warn actions. But courts have 
mostly found these claims to be preempted at summary judgment, or even 
earlier. The Southern District of Ohio’s analysis in Aaron v. Medtronic, 
Inc.,230 is representative. In this consolidated action, several hundred 
patients alleged that they suffered intractable pain, inflammatory 
reactions, chronic radiculitis, retrograde ejaculation, sterility, and other 
complications caused by excessive bone growth.231 The court granted 
                                                     
224. FDA, HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: VICTOZA (2010), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2010/022341lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN9U-
FMRC]. 
225. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, P000058, SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DATA: 
INFUSE BONE GRAFT/LT-CAGE LUMBAR TAPERED FUSION DEVICE 31 (2002), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf/P000058B.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ58-H4MA]. 
226. Id. at 8 (“The reported rates of several adverse events were high, but similar, in both the 
investigational and control groups.”). 
227. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages at 77–79 ¶¶ 250–57, Alton v. Medtronic, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 
2d 1069 (D. Or. 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-00409-PK). 
228. Eugene J. Carragee, Eric L. Hurwitz & Bradley K. Weiner, A Critical Review of Recombinant 
Human Bone Morphogenetic Protein-2 Trials in Spinal Surgery: Emerging Safety Concerns and 
Lessons Learned, 11 SPINE J. 471, 474, 485 (2011). 
229. Id. at 471.  
230. Aaron v. Medtronic, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 994 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 
231. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Aaron, 209 F. 
Supp. 3d at 994. 
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Medtronic’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), 
finding plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims preempted.232 The court 
assumed that the InFUSE/LT-CAGE combination product, including the 
rhBMP-2 protein, is a Class III medical device.233 Observing that a state 
failure-to-warn verdict would require Medtronic to provide a stronger 
warning, which would be “different from, or in addition to” the labeling 
required by the FDA, the court held that section 360k of the Medical 
Device Amendments expressly preempted these claims.234 Dismissal at 
this early stage precluded discovery, which might have unearthed 
information regarding the risks of rhBMP-2. Thus, neither the federal nor 
the state layer of regulation functioned to promote the generation and 
dissemination of risk information concerning the rhBMP-2 constituent as 
robustly as they would have had the InFUSE/LT-CAGE product been 
approved through the NDA process. 
The lower courts have confronted preemption defenses in nearly fifty 
InFUSE/LT-CAGE tort and products liability cases involving thousands 
of plaintiffs. As in Aaron, most courts have held that PMA approval 
preempts state law failure-to-warn claims.235 Courts have found claims to 
                                                     
232. Aaron, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1006. 
233. Id. at 997–98. 
234. Id. at 1004. 
235. See, e.g., Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015); Aaron, 209 F. Supp. 
3d at 994; Anderson v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 14–cv–00615–BAS(RBB), 2015 WL 2115342, at *7 
(S.D. Cal. May 6, 2015); Byrnes v. Small, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2015); Jones v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 89 F. Supp. 3d 1035 (D. Ariz. 2015); Mendez v. Shah, 94 F. Supp. 3d 633 (D.N.J. 2015); Thorn 
v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 619 (W.D. Mich. 2015); Wright v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 600 (W.D. Mich. 2015); Arthur v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 4:14–CV–52 
(CEJ), 2014 WL 3894365 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2014); Arvizu v. Medtronic, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 783 
(D. Ariz. 2014); Blankenship v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2014); Brady v. 
Medtronic, Inc., No. 13–cv–62199–RNS, 2014 WL 1377830, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2014); ; 
Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 223 Cal.App.4th 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); Dunbar v. Medtronic, Inc., 
No. CV 14–01529–RGK (AJWx), 2014 WL 3056026 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2014); Eidson v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:13–CV–00499 AWI 
SKO, 2014 WL 346622, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2014); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 
1050 (D. Ariz. 2014); McCormick v. Medtronic, Inc., 101 A.3d 467 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014); 
Scanlon v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 403 (D. Del. 2014); Schouest v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 692 (S.D. Tex. 2014); Scovil v. Medtronic, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1082 
(D. Ariz. 2014); Zaccarello v. Medtronic, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1061 (W.D. Mo. 2014); Alton v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Ore. 2013); Dawson v. Medtronic, Inc., C/A No. 3:13–cv–
663–JFA, 2013 WL 4048850, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2013); Houston v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 
2d 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Kashani-Matts v. Medtronic, Inc., No. SACV 13–01161–CJC(RNBx), 
2013 WL 6147032, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013); Ledet v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:13CV200–LG–
JMR, 2013 WL 6858858 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2013); Otis-Wisher v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc., 
951 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Vt. 2013); Angeles v. Medtronic, Inc., 863 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2015). Other cases with the same outcome involved state statutory protections. Lyles v. Medtronic, 
Inc., Docket No.: 3:15–cv–00910, 2015 WL 9997860 (W.D. La. Nov. 23, 2014); Smith v. Medtronic, 
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be preempted even where the plaintiffs alleged that only the drug 
constituent was used.236 In the few cases where courts held that plaintiffs’ 
failure-to-warn claims were not preempted, the basis was that Medtronic 
had engaged in off-label promotion of the product; in these cases the 
courts still assumed that InFUSE/LT-CAGE was a device.237 
The impact of these cases is unmistakable: new drugs—the adverse 
effects of which cannot be adequately predicted and characterized prior to 
broad human exposure—can be approved by the FDA based on the 
relatively limited data required for device approvals provided the 
manufacturer submits the new drug as a constituent of a combination 
product that also contains a high-risk device.238 This is true, even though 
the risks posed by new drugs incorporated into drug-device combination 
medical products may be more difficult to predict than the risks posed by 
any other category of medical products. And, in courts that adopt the 
majority approach illustrated by Aaron, state tort and products liability 
actions are preempted by application of Section 360k, eliminating the 
information-producing incentives that state law might otherwise provide. 
Thus, the information deficits presented by some combination products 
are not remedied by the rigorous two-layered regulatory regime to which 
new drugs are subjected. It is this truncated function of both federal and 
state information forcing that this Article refers to as a “regulatory gap.” 
As a result of this gap, new drugs may reach patients with significant 
deficits in risk information. Given the current trends, the number of these 
new drugs can be expected to increase as manufacturers increasingly shift 
to developing combination products. 
These cases illustrate the fact that combination product approval may 
subvert the emergent, calibrated information-forcing system of federal 
and state regulation set out in section I.C. The next part explores in detail 
                                                     
Inc., Civil Action No. 13–451, 2014 WL 2547813 (W.D. La. June 4, 2014); Gavin v. Medtronic, Inc., 
No. 12–0851, 2013 WL 3791612 (E.D. La. July 19, 2013). 
236. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Medtronic, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 977, 983 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“When Dr. 
Wang performed Ramirez’s lumbar fusion operation, he used only the rhBMP–2 bone graft 
component of the Infuse device. . . .”); Amended Complaint at ¶ 21, Aaron, 209 F. Supp. 3d 994 
(noting that the surgeon “uses BMP-2 with and without a cage”); First Amended Complaint at ¶ 250, 
Angeles, 863 N.W.2d 404 (“MEDTRONIC packaged and sold the LT-Cage independently from the 
Infuse®> Bone Graft Kit so that the Infuse® kit could be used either with other cages or without a 
cage at all.”). The cage and the rhBMP-2 are packaged separate from one another. 
237.  Norabuena v. Medtronic, Inc., 86 N.E.3d 1198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017); Garross v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 809 (E.D. Wis. 2015); Ramirez v. Medtronic Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 977 (D. Ariz. 
2013); Beavers-Gabriel v. Medtronic, Inc., Civ. No. 13–00686 JMS–RLP, 2015 WL 143944 (D. Haw. 
Jan. 9, 2015); Hornbeck v. Medtronic, Inc., 13 C 7816, 2014 WL 2510817 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2014).  
238. Industry participants and consultants openly recognize the practical benefits of seeking FDA 
approval through the device rather than the drug pathways. See, e.g., Drues, supra note 34 (“CDRH 
is the easiest regulatory path through the FDA.”). 
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how the regulatory gap itself has emerged. 
III. THE REGULATORY GAP IN DRUG-DEVICE COMBINATION 
PRODUCT APPROVAL 
This Part examines the immediate causes of the regulatory gap, 
beginning with the federal side of the gap in section III.A. Approving new 
drugs (such as rhBMP-2) through the PMA process instead of the NDA 
process is an exercise of discretion that is within the FDA’s statutory 
authority. In granting that authority, Congress was addressing policy 
considerations far removed from the information-forcing functions of the 
NDA process. Turning to the state side of the gap, neither Congress nor 
the FDA nor the Supreme Court has addressed whether federal regulation 
of combination products preempts state tort and product liability actions. 
Nonetheless, as section III.B shows, most courts in cases involving the 
Infuse/LT-Cage product, drug eluting stents, and other drug-device 
combination products have found state law to be expressly preempted. 
Section III.B argues that in their preemption analyses, these courts have 
assumed the answers to three key questions regarding the appropriate 
construction of the term “combination product” and the preemptive reach 
of the express preemption provision of the MDA. These assumptions lead 
to outcomes that subvert the information-forcing regulatory system that 
Part I described. 
A. Federal Regulation of Combination Products: The Federal Side of 
the Gap 
Congress first addressed the regulation of combination products in the 
Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (“SMDA,” or “Act”).239 Section 16 of 
the Act amended the FDCA, which at the time contained distinct 
regulatory regimes for prescription drugs, medical devices, and biological 
products. Under that earlier regime, a manufacturer of a combination 
product had to obtain approval for each individual constituent of the 
product.240 Section 16 directed the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to “designate a component of the [FDA] to regulate 
products that constitute a combination of a drug, device, or biological 
product.”241 The Act requires the FDA to choose a single component, or 
                                                     
239. Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 16, 104 Stat. 4526 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2012)).   
240. BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., SAFE MEDICAL DEVICES ACT OF 1990: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
PUBLIC LAW NO. 101-629, at 31 (1996). 
241. § 16, 104 Stat. at 4526 (emphasis added). “Agency component” refers to the various sub-
Agency “centers,” each of which is responsible for the regulation of a certain category of products. 
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regulatory center, determined by “the primary mode of action of the 
combination product,”242 which the FDA interprets to mean “the single 
mode of action of a combination product that provides the most important 
therapeutic action of the combination product.”243 
The SMDA created a regulatory regime for combination products that 
is fundamentally different from the regimes that govern non-combination 
drugs and devices. For non-combination products, determining the 
statutory definition entails assigning the same regulatory identity—in 
general, a product defined as a drug will be regulated as a drug, and a 
product defined as a device will be regulated as a device.244 But the 
combination products regime splits statutory definition and regulatory 
identity. The FDA first determines a product’s statutory identity 
(“[Classifying] . . . the product as a drug, biological product, device, or a 
combination product . . . .”).245 For combination products, the agency then 
assigns a regulatory identity (“the component of the Food and Drug 
Administration that will regulate the product”) based on the primary mode 
of action.246 A product that meets the statutory definition of a drug, when 
incorporated into a drug-device combination product, may not necessarily 
provide “the most important therapeutic action.”247 Under Section 16, 
such a drug, along with the other constituents of a combination product, 
will be assigned to CDRH for premarket evaluation under the agency’s 
device authorities. 
                                                     
See supra note 47. Under the SMDA, the designated center is then responsible for premarket review 
and subsequent regulation over the entire life cycle of the product. 
242. Id.  
243. 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(m) (2019). 
244. Illustrating the importance of a product’s statutory identity, in cases that predate the MDA, 
the FDA defined some devices as drugs in order to bring those devices within the Agency’s drug 
regulatory authority. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (FDA defining nylon ligature as a drug); United States v. 48 Dozen Packages, 
etc., 94 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1938) (FDA defining gauze bandages as drugs). The MDA addressed these 
“transitional devices,” ordering the FDA to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking in order to 
reclassify them as Class III devices. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 
§ 520(l), 90 Stat. 572 (1976) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)). 
245. FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 416(a), 111 Stat. 2378 (1997) 
(codified as amended at 21 USC § 360bbb-2 (2012)). 
246. See id. 
247. 21 C.F.R. § (3)(1)(m). For example, the primary intended purpose of a drug-eluting stent is to 
maintain the patency of a coronary artery. Both the stent device and the antiproliferative drug 
contribute to this effect. However, the FDA has determined that the device mode of action—the 
physical action of the stent—contributes more to the primary intended purpose of keeping the artery 
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The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA)248 highlighted the 
distinct features of combination products regulation. FDAMA created a 
process through which manufacturers can “submit a request to the 
Secretary respecting the classification of the product as a drug, biological 
product, device, or a combination product . . . or respecting the 
component of the Food and Drug Administration that will regulate the 
product.”249 FDA regulations and guidance documents confirm that the 
Agency views the determination of a combination product’s statutory 
definition and its regulatory identity as two separate acts.250 Implementing 
FDAMA, the FDA also created an informal “pre-RFD” through which a 
manufacturer can obtain a “nonbinding assessment of the regulatory 
identity or classification of a product as a drug, device, biological product, 
or combination product.”251 
The 21st Century Cures Act,252 which was enacted in 2016, reinforces 
the unique structure of the combination products regulatory regime. The 
Cures Act prohibits the FDA from determining the primary mode of 
action of a combination product, and thus the assignment of a regulatory 
identity of a combination product, “solely because the combination 
product has any chemical action within or on the human body.”253 The 
Cures Act clarifies that different rules now determine the assignment of 
regulatory identities for combination products and for drugs and 
devices.254 The FDA may define and regulate a non-combination product 
as a drug if chemical action supplies any of the means through which it 
achieves its primary purpose. By contrast, for a combination product—
including its drug constituents—to be regulated as a drug, chemical action 
must “make the greatest contribution to the overall intended [] 
effects . . . .”255 Thus, some products that exert drug action, which would 
                                                     
248. FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 416, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)). 
249. Id. (emphasis added). 
250. See, e.g., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: HOW TO WRITE A REQUEST FOR DESIGNATION 
(RFD) 3 (2011), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM251544.p
df [https://perma.cc/V9FV-7U9E] (noting that requests for designation may seek a determination of 
“the regulatory identity or classification of a product as a drug, device, biological product, or 
combination product”). 
251. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: HOW TO PREPARE A PRE-REQUEST FOR DESIGNATION (PRE-
RFD) (2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm534898.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6FY-JUM5]. 
252. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3038, 503(g), 130 Stat. 1033, 1105 (2016). 
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be required to undergo rigorous NDA approval if submitted as a non-
combination product, may be approved under the less-rigorous PMA 
process if submitted as part of a combination product. 
The determination of a medical product’s statutory identity and of a 
combination product’s primary mode of action are exercises of an expert 
agency’s statutorily conferred discretion. Courts typically grant the 
FDA’s decisions on these matters strong, Chevron-type deference256 
under which courts defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute.257 Further, the FDCA now incorporates a default in 
favor of the manufacturer’s preferred assignment of a regulatory identity. 
By statute, a manufacturer may “suggest” the regulatory identity the FDA 
should assign its product.258 Because the device pathways are less costly, 
lengthy, and demanding, manufacturers will most often suggest to the 
FDA that it assign a regulatory identity of a device.259 The agency has a 
short sixty-day window in which to disagree, after which the 
manufacturer’s suggested identity becomes binding on the agency.260 
Thus, the premarket evaluation of new drugs submitted as constituents of 
combination products will be channeled into the PMA pathway, creating 
the federal side of the regulatory gap. As a result of this channeling, the 
information-forcing functions served by the FDA’s premarket evaluation 
of some new drugs has been constrained, as the history of the rhBMP-2 
constituent of the Infuse/LT-Cage product illustrates.261 
B. Lower Courts and Preemption: The State Side of the Gap 
In recent years, the lower federal and state courts have created the state 
side of the regulatory gap by endorsing preemption defenses in a growing 
number of tort and products liability cases involving the Infuse/LT-Cage 
product, drug eluting stents, transdermal patches, and other drug-device 
combination products. As this section argues, the courts in these cases 
have had little to guide their preemption analyses. Congress did not 
expressly preempt state law claims against combination products 
                                                     
   256. 467 U.S. 837 (2984).   
257. See Prevor v. FDA, 67 F. Supp. 3d 125, 137 (D.D.C. 2014) (stating that Chevron deference 
applies to FDA determinations of primary mode of action). Where the Chevron analysis of an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute finds the statute itself to be ambiguous, empirical data have shown 
that the agency’s view prevailed in over 90% of cases. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron 
in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 35 fig.3 (2017). 
258. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(c) (2012). 
259. See Drues, supra note 34. 
260. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(c). 
261. See supra notes 224–229 and accompanying text. 
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manufacturers in the SMDA or in any subsequent legislation. Nor has 
Congress explicitly applied section 360k, the medical device express 
preemption provision, to combination products. Further, the FDA has not 
provided its view as to whether its regulation of combination products 
preempts state law. Nor has the Supreme Court addressed this question.262 
Nonetheless, courts have almost always found that FDA approval 
preempts tort and product liability failure-to-warn claims. These decisions 
have created the state side of the regulatory gap. 
For example, in Riley v. Cordis Corp.263 the plaintiff suffered a heart 
attack after doctors placed a “Cypher,” a drug-eluting stent made by 
Cordis, into one of his coronary arteries. He brought claims against Cordis 
under Minnesota law, including negligence and strict products liability 
failure-to-warn claims.264 The Cypher was a first-generation drug-eluting 
stent that consisted of a PMA-approved stent device coated in Sirolimus, 
an NDA-approved drug.265 First generation drug-eluting stents were 
associated with a novel complication: “late in-stent thrombosis,” the 
development of a blood clot inside the stent years after the stent was 
placed.266 Riley’s heart attack occurred two years after his physicians 
placed the Cypher into his coronary artery. He argued that had Cordis 
adequately warned about the risk of late in-stent thrombosis, his doctors 
would have ordered his treatment with two or more blood thinners to have 
continued indefinitely, which would have prevented his heart attack.267 
The court held that section 360k expressly preempted the failure-to-
warn claims.268 Attempting to avoid preemption, Riley urged that in its 
preemption analysis the court should treat the Cypher as an aggregation 
of individual constituents, each subject to its own preemption rules.269 In 
                                                     
262. The Court’s only mention of combination products came in FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), where the majority opinion referred to cigarettes as “so-called 
‘combination products’” or simply enclosed the term within quotation marks. Id. at 125–27, 129 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1)). The dissent appeared to view a combination product as a device that 
contains a drug. Id. at 175 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘[C]ombination product’—i.e., a 'device' (such as 
a cigarette) that contains a ‘drug’ (such as nicotine).”). 
263. 625 F. Supp. 2d 769 (D. Minn. 2009). 
264. Id. at 773. 
265. Cordis licensed the brand version of sirolimus, Rapamune, from the patent and NDA holder, 
Wyeth. See CYPHER(R) Sirolimus-Eluting Coronary Stent Receives FDA Approval for MRI Scans 
Immediately Following Implantation, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 20, 2005), https://johnsonandjohnson.gcs-
web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/cypherr-sirolimus-eluting-coronary-stent-receives-fda-
approval [https://perma.cc/KS2T-BUGL].  
266. See supra notes 212–216 and accompanying text. 
267. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 780 (D. Minn. 2009).  
268. Id. at 783. 
269. Id. at 779–80 (“Riley also argues that, because the Cypher stent is coated with a drug, the 
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Riley’s view, the new drug constituent of the Cypher had caused the heart 
attack. Under Wyeth, a failure-to-warn claim arising from the new drug 
itself would not have been preempted.270 The court rejected this argument. 
Instead, the court made the first of three key assumptions that are 
characteristic of courts’ preemption analyses in the combination products 
cases. The court stated without explanation or analysis that the Cypher 
was a single entity, “a compound of mechanical and chemical parts that 
work together.”271 Courts in the majority of combination products cases 
have agreed—usually without discussion—that combination products are 
single entities.272 
Physically, drug eluting stents are indeed single entities. The stent and 
the antiproliferative coating cannot be separated and used individually. 
But courts have also made the single entity assumption in most of the 
Infuse/LT-Cage cases as well, even though the drug constituent (rhBMP-
2) is manufactured and packaged separately from the device (LT-Tapered 
Cage). And courts have made this assumption even where plaintiffs have 
alleged that their physicians had used only the rhBMP-2 constituent.273 
The Riley Court’s second key assumption is that in a preemption analysis 
a combination product is considered to be either a drug or a device, 
determined by the regulatory identity which the FDA has assigned. But as 
section III.A has shown, this is not the only identity that may be relevant: 
Combination products also have a statutory identity—under the FDCA they 
are defined as combination products, not as drugs or devices.274 Without 
confronting this question, the Riley court assumed that the Cypher was a 
device, noting that the “mechanical and chemical parts [] work together as 
                                                     
preemption analysis of § 360k(a) is inapplicable, and the Court must instead undertake the implied-
preemption analysis that applies to claims relating to federally regulated drugs [under Wyeth].”). 
270. See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text. 
271. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d. at 779 (emphasis added). 
272. Lauricella v. Cordis Corp., No. C 07-2016 SBA (PR), 2010 WL 2673328, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (“[A]n allegedly defective medical device known as ‘Cypher.’”); Cordis Corp. v. O’Shea, 24 
So. 3d 576, 577 (Fla. App. 2009) (“The Cypher stent is considered a Class III medical device. . . .”); 
McQuiston v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 07–1723, 2009 WL 4016120, at *4 (W.D. La. Nov. 19, 2009) 
(“[T]he TAXUS Stent is a Class III device.”); Angeles v. Medtronic, Inc., 863 N.W.2d 404, 410 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2015); Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1051 (N.J. 2012) (“Class III 
devices, like the Cypher® stent. . . .”); Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 998 A.2d 543, 547 (N.J. Super. 
A.D. 2010) (“[A]lleged defects in a medical device, the Cypher® Sirolimus–Eluting Coronary 
Stent. . . .”).  
273. Aaron v. Medtronic, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 994, 999 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Ledet v. Medtronic, 
Inc., No. 1:13CV200-LG-JMR, 2013 WL 6858858, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2013); Alton v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075 (D. Ore. 2013). 
274. See supra notes 244–247 and accompanying text. 
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a single medical device.” 275 Courts in other drug eluting stent cases have 
done the same.276 Likewise, in the Infuse/LT-Cage cases courts have 
typically assumed that the product is a “medical device,”277 or a “Class III 
medical device.”278 Only rarely have courts recognized that drug-eluting 
stents and the Infuse/LT-Cage product are statutorily defined as 
combination products. Often, the plaintiffs’ themselves characterized the 
combination product by the regulatory identity assigned by the FDA.279 But 
                                                     
275. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (emphasis added). 
276. See supra note 272. 
277. See generally Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015); Aaron v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 994 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Anderson v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 14–cv–
00615–BAS(RBB), 2015 WL 2115342 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2015); Byrnes v. Small, 60 F. Supp. 3d 
1289 (M.D. Fla. 2015); Jones v. Medtronic, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1035 (D. Ariz. 2015); Lyles v. Medtronic, 
Inc., No. 3:15–cv–00910, 2015 WL 9997860 (W.D. La. Nov. 23, 2015); Mendez v. Shah, 94 F. Supp. 
3d 633 (D.N.J. 2015); Thorn v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 619 (W.D. 
Mich. 2015); Wright v. Medtronic, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 600 (W.D. Mich. 2015); Arthur v. Medtronic, 
Inc., No. 4:14–CV–52 (CEJ), 2014 WL 3894365 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2014); Arvizu v. Medtronic Inc., 
41 F. Supp. 3d 783 (D. Ariz. 2014); Blankenship v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 979 (E.D. Mo. 
2014); Brady v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13–cv–62199–RNS, 2014 WL 1377830 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2014); 
Dunbar v. Medtronic, Inc., No. CV 14–01529–RGK (AJWx), 2014 WL 3056026 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 
2014); Eidson v. Medtronic, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc., 
No. 1:13–CV–00499 AWI SKO, 2014 WL 346622 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2014); Martin v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (D. Ariz. 2014); Scanlon v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA Inc., 61 F. 
Supp. 3d 403 (D. Del. 2014); Schouest v. Medtronic, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 692 (S.D. Tex. 2014); Scovil 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D. Ariz. 2014); Zaccarello v. Medtronic, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 
3d 1061 (W.D. Mo. 2014); Alton v. Medtronic, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Or. 2013); Dawson v. 
Medtronic, Inc., C/A No. 3:13–cv–663–JFA, 2013 WL 4048850 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2013); Houston v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Kashani-Matts v. Medtronic, Inc., No. SACV 
13–01161–CJC(RNBx), 2013 WL 6147032 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013); Ledet v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 
1:13CV200–LG–JMR, 2013 WL 6858858 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2013); Otis-Wisher v. Fletcher Allen 
Health Care, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Vt. 2013); Angeles v. Medtronic, Inc., 863 N.W.2d 404 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2015); Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 223 Cal. App. 4th 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); 
McCormick v. Medtronic, Inc., 219 Md. App. 485 (2014). Other cases with the same outcome 
involved state statutory protections. See Smith v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13–451, 2014 WL 2547813 
(W.D. La. June 4, 2014); Gavin v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 12–0851, 2013 WL 3791612 (E.D. La. July 
19, 2013).  
278. See, e.g., Aaron, 209 F. Supp. at 998 (“Infuse, like all medical devices sold in the United 
States.”); Anders v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 4:14CV00194 ERW, 2014 WL 1652352, at *1 (E.D. Mo. 
Apr. 24, 2014); Hawkins, 2014 WL 346622 at *1; Alton, 970 F. Supp. at 1074 (describing Infuse/LT-
Cage as a Class III medical device). 
279. See Lauricella v. Cordis Corp., No. C 07–2016 SBA (PR), 2010 WL 2673328, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. July 2, 2010) (“[Plaintiff’s] complaint alleges that Defendant, a Florida corporation, is liable for 
designing and/or manufacturing an allegedly defective medical device known as ‘Cypher.’”); 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at ¶ 7, Caplinger, 784 F.3d 1335 (describing Infuse as “a bio-
engineered bone graft device”); Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 22, O’Shea v. Cordis Corp., 
24 So.3d 576 (Fl. Ct. App. 2008) (No. 4D09-1597) (“[T]he Cypher™ Sirolimus eluting stent was a 
medical device.”). But see Garross v. Medtronic, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 809, 815 (E.D. Wis. 2015) 
(noting that the “[p]laintiff contends [] that no federal requirements apply to the bone graft component 
itself because premarket approval applied only to the use of the components together”); David v. 
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even where plaintiffs have argued that the proper characterization of 
Infuse/LT-Cage combination product was something other than a “device,” 
courts have treated the product as a device.280 
The Riley Court also made a third key assumption: that section 360k 
and the Riegel test apply to statutorily defined combination products that 
have been approved through the PMA pathway. The court found that 
section 360k expressly preempted the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims 
against the manufacturer of a drug-eluting stent.281 Likewise, in Caplinger 
v. Medtronic, Inc.,282 the majority and dissent both applied the 
section 360k and Riegel framework to analyze the plaintiff’s state law 
claims against the manufacturer of the Infuse/LT-Cage product, never 
stopping to consider whether that framework was appropriate.283 Courts 
in most of the drug-eluting stent and Infuse/LT-Cage cases have relied on 
this assumption.284 
These three assumptions determine the preemption outcomes that most 
courts have reached. The first assumption—that combination products are 
single entities and not mere aggregations of individual drugs and 
devices—is consistent with Congress’s conception of combination 
products as that conception has evolved since 1990, and with the FDA’s 
conception of these products since the Agency issued its final rule that 
implemented the SMDA. The other two assumptions, though, are difficult 
to support. Sections B.1 through B.3 examine each of these assumptions 
in turn, in order to determine whether the regulatory gap is a necessary 
result of federal regulation. 
                                                     
Medtronic, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-04441 DMG (CW), 2013 WL 12132038 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 
2013) (noting without deciding that “the Complaint alleges that Infuse is wrongfully categorized as a 
‘device’ rather than a “combination product” under the FDCA . . . .”); see also Baker v. St. Jude Med., 
S.C., Inc., 178 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. App. 2005) (regarding a prosthetic heart valve with an 
antibacterial silver coating, “[i]t is undisputed that a heart valve is a Class III medical device,” 
suggesting that plaintiffs simply accepted the FDA’s classification of the Silzone as a device). 
280. Angeles, 863 N.W.2d at 409 (discussing plaintiff’s argument that the individual constituents 
of the Infuse product were not the same as the product itself, and thus were not subject to preemption 
under the medical device framework); Aaron, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (discussing the same). 
281. Riley v. Medtronic, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (D. Minn. 2009). 
282. 784 F.3d 1335, 1337 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Medtronic produces Infuse, a device that stimulates 
bone growth. . . .”). 
283. See id. at 1340 (“There’s no dispute in our case that device-specific federal requirements apply 
to Infuse: the device endured the premarket approval process.”); id. at 1355 (Lucero, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that Riegel applied but disagreeing with the outcome). 
284. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
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1. Are Combination Products Single Entities or Do They Remain 
Aggregations of Individual Constituents? 
The first assumption that most courts have made in the Infuse/LT-Cage 
and drug-eluting stent cases is that combination products are single 
entities.285 At stake is whether a single preemption analysis will determine 
the role of state law, or whether each constituent of the combination 
product will be subjected to its own preemption analysis. In the latter case, 
claims of harm arising from a PMA-approved device constituent would 
be preempted while claims of harm arising from a new drug constituent 
would not. State law would regulate only certain parts of a drug-device 
combination product. 
The text of Section 16 of the Safe Medical Devices Act suggests that 
Congress originally conceived of combination products as aggregations 
of individual constituents as opposed to single entities. Section 16 refers 
to “products that constitute a combination of a drug, device, or biological 
product.”286 Understanding “constitute” to mean “[t]o give legal . . . form 
to (something)” or “[t]o make up or form,”287 Congress appears to have 
been directing the Secretary how to regulate the individual products that 
are combined by a manufacturer. The structure of the SMDA is also 
consistent with this conception. Ever since Congress enacted the FDCA 
in 1938, the product category definitions have been lodged in Section 321. 
But Section 16 expressly placed the description of combination products 
into 21 U.S.C. § 353, which has governed the labeling and distribution of 
drugs and devices. Thus, parts of the text and structure of Section 16 
suggest that Congress did not conceive of combination products as a 
distinct product category, but rather as individual constituents intended 
for use together. 
But other parts of Section 16 render Congress’s initial conception of 
combination products unclear. The title of Section 16 refers to articles 
made up of combinations of drugs, devices, and biologics.288 The FDCA 
uses the term “articles” to refer to the distinctly-defined product categories 
                                                     
285. See supra notes 269–273 and accompanying text. 
286. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 16(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4511, 4526 
(1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2012)). 
287. Constitute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); accord THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1995) (“To be the elements or parts of . . . .”); 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 
(3d ed. 2002) (“[T]he element or elements of which a thing . . . is made up.”). 
288. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-62, § 16, 104 Stat. 4511, 4526 (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2012)) (“Review of Market Applications for Articles Comprising 
Combinations of Drugs, Devices, and Biologics”). 
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that are regulated by the FDA, which at that time were drugs, devices, and 
biological products.289 Referring to a combination of individual 
constituents as an article suggests a conception of a combination product 
as a single entity, and by extension a conception of combination products 
as a fourth, distinct product category. The title describes these articles as 
“[c]omprising [c]ombinations of [d]rugs, [d]evices, and [b]iologics.”290 
Understanding “comprise” to mean “to include” or “to consist of,”291 the 
title purports to regulate articles—members of a category of products—
that consist of some combination of drugs, devices, and biologics. The 
structure of the regime established by Section 16 also suggests an intent 
to regulate combination products as single entities. The amending 
language of Section 16 directs the Secretary to “determine the primary 
mode of action of the combination product.”292 Once determined, the FDA 
must assign the product, and each of its constituents, to a single sub-
Agency center for approval under a single pathway. Under this regime, 
the constituents are regulated at the federal level as parts of a single, 
complete entity. 
Thus, the text, structure, and legislative history of the SMDA reveal an 
ambiguity in Congress’s original conception of combination products. 
This ambiguity did not create uncertainty as to which federal premarket 
regime should apply once the primary mode of action of a combination 
product was determined. But as explained below, the SMDA’s ambiguity 
leaves Congress’s intent toward the state layer of regulation uncertain. 
By contrast, the FDA has consistently defined and referred to 
combination products as a distinct, sui generis product category. The 
FDA’s Final Rule implementing Section 16293 created a new section of 
the Code of Federal regulations that provides separate definitions for 
drugs, devices, biological products, and combination products.294 The rule 
consistently refers to combination products as a category distinct from 
                                                     
289. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f)–(i) (2012) (defining food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics in terms of 
“articles”). 
290. Pub. L. No. 101-62, § 16, 104 Stat. 4511, 4526. 
291. Comprise, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (2002); accord THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1995) (“To consist of . . . to include.”). 
292. Pub. L. No. 101-62, § 16(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4511, 4526.  
293. Assignment of Agency Component for Review of Premarket Applications, 56 Fed. Reg. 
58,754 (Nov. 21, 1991). 
294.  21 C.F.R. § 3.2(d)–(g) (2019).  
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drugs, devices, and biological products.295 FDA regulations implementing 
later congressional acts are consistent with this reading.296 
Within a decade, Congress appears to have adopted the FDA’s view of 
“combination products” as a fourth, distinct medical product category. 
The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),297 speaks in terms of 
four distinct medical product categories. FDAMA created a process 
through which manufacturers can “submit a request to the Secretary 
respecting the classification of the product as a drug, biological product, 
device, or a combination product . . . or respecting the component of the 
Food and Drug Administration that will regulate the product.”298 The 
Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 (MDUFMA)299 
created what would become the current Office of Combination Products, 
charged with assigning “combination products to agency centers . . . .”300 
The recently enacted 21st Century Cures Act301 addresses combination 
products and medical devices in separate subtitles.302 And the Cures Act 
requires a product sponsor to identify relevant products as combination 
products when the sponsor seeks any agency action.303 
In spite of initial ambiguity, Congress appears to conceive of 
“combination products” as a distinct product category. The FDA has 
consistently conceived of combination products as a distinct category. 
                                                     
295.  21 C.F.R. § 3.3 (2019); see also 21 C.F.R. § 4.101 (2019) (“Combination product applicant 
means an applicant that holds the application(s) for a combination product.”) (emphasis in original); 
21 C.F.R. § 3.2(m) (2019) (defining primary mode of action as “the single mode of action of a 
combination product that provides the most important therapeutic action of the combination product”) 
(emphasis added); Assignment of Agency Component for Review of Premarket Applications, supra 
note 293 (stating that the scope of the rule is not limited “to the combination products specified in the 
law” because “it also applies to any drug, device, or biological product where the jurisdiction is 
unclear or in dispute”). 
296. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 4.101 (“Combination product applicant means an applicant that holds 
the application(s) for a combination product.”); see also 21 C.F.R. § 3.7(a)(1)–(2) (2019) (stating that 
sponsors of any drug, device, biological, or combination product may submit a request for designation 
of the center which will be assigned primary jurisdiction); 21 C.F.R. § 3.7(c)(2)(i) (2019) (stating that 
the sponsor of a combination or non-combination product seeking a designation must include in their 
request “[a] description of the product, including [the] [c]lassification, name of the product and all 
component products . . . ”). 
297.  Pub. L. No. 105-115 § 416, 11 Stat. 2378 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2 (2012)). 
298. Id. 
299.  Pub. L. No. 107-250, §§ 204, 503(g), 116 Stat. 1588, 1611 (2002). 
300. Id. 
301. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255 sec. 3038, § 503(g), 130 Stat. 1033, 1105 (2016). 
302. Id. (locating provisions applicable to combination products in Title III.D and provisions 
addressing devices in Title III.F). 
303. Id. sec. 3038, § 503(a)(4). The Act requires a product sponsor to identify relevant products as 
combination products when the sponsor seeks any agency action with respect to the product. Id.  
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Both Congress and the FDA have consistently demonstrated the intent to 
regulate combination products as single entities as opposed to regulating 
them as individual constituents. This statutory and regulatory history 
supports courts’ assumption that combination products are single entities. 
But this leaves unanswered the question of exactly what kind of single 
entity they are. 
2. Is Statutory Definition or Regulatory Identity Relevant in a 
Preemption Analysis? 
The second important assumption that courts have made in the 
Infuse/LT-Cage and drug-eluting stent cases is that a combination product 
is either a drug or a device, determined by the regulatory identity which 
the FDA has assigned.304 But this assumption overlooks a key aspect of 
combination products regulation: unlike drugs, devices, and biological 
products, for combination products the statutory definition and regulatory 
identity are two distinct attributes.305 The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 
clarified the steps involved in assigning these attributes. The FDA first 
determines a product’s statutory identity through its “classification of the 
product as a drug, biological product, device, or a combination 
product.”306 Then the agency assigns a regulatory identity (“the 
component of the Food and Drug Administration that will regulate the 
product”).307 For non-combination products, the assignment of a 
regulatory identity is determined by the statutory definition: a product that 
meets the statutory definition of a drug is regulated as a drug, while a 
product that meets the statutory definition of a device is regulated as a 
device. For combination products, though, the statutory definition does 
not determine the regulatory identity. Rather, the regulatory identity 
assignment is based on the primary mode of action, the determination of 
which is a separate step.308 
                                                     
304. See supra notes 275–280 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra notes 244–247 and accompanying text. 
306. Pub. L. 105-115, § 563(a), 111 Stat. 2378 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2 (2012)) 
(emphasis added). 
307. Id. 
308. See, e.g., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: HOW TO WRITE A REQUEST FOR DESIGNATION 
(RFD) 3 (2011), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM251544.p
df [https://perma.cc/8ASB-88BH] (noting that requests for designation may seek a determination of 
“the regulatory identity or classification of a product as a drug, device, biological product, or 
combination product . . .”). 
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The 21st Century Cures Act reiterates the distinction between a 
product’s statutory definition and regulatory identity.309 The Act also 
clarifies that there are different rules for assigning regulatory identities for 
combination products as compared with drugs and devices. The Act 
prohibits the FDA from determining the primary mode of action and thus 
the assignment of a regulatory identity of a combination product “solely 
because the combination product has any chemical action within or on the 
human body.”310 For a non-combination product, the FDA may define the 
product and regulate it as a drug if chemical action supplies any of the 
means of achieving its primary purpose. By contrast, for a combination 
product to be regulated as a drug, chemical action must “make the greatest 
contribution to the overall intended [] effects.”311 Thus, some new 
products that exert drug action and pose the unforeseeable risks 
characteristic of new drugs—and which would be required to undergo 
rigorous NDA approval if submitted as a non-combination product—may 
be approved under the less-rigorous PMA process if submitted as a 
constituent of a combination product. 
Unlike other medical products, all “combination products” thus have 
two identities.312 They are statutorily defined separately from drugs and 
devices, as “combination products.”313 But they are regulated as drugs or 
devices.314 By overlooking the fact that combination products have two 
identities, courts fail to address a key question: which identity is relevant 
in a preemption analysis? Nothing in the SMDA, FDAMA, or any other 
congressional act provides the answer. Nor has the FDA stated its views. 
The answer may depend on whether a court was conducting an express 
or an implied preemption analysis. For an express preemption analysis, in 
which courts must determine the scope of a statutory provision, the answer 
lies in the specific statutory language, as discussed in section III.B.3. In an 
implied preemption analysis, especially an obstacle preemption analysis, 
the more likely answer is that the relevant identity is the product’s 
regulatory identity as a drug or a device. If so, the existing drug and device 
frameworks forged in Lohr, Buckman, Riegel, Wyeth, PLIVA, and Mutual 
Pharmaceuticals would determine the analytic approach. However, if the 
relevant identity were the product’s statutory identity—combination 
product—then courts would need to create a new implied preemption 
                                                     
309. Id. (requiring a product sponsor to identify relevant products as combination products when 
the sponsor seeks any agency action with respect to the product). 
310. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(E). 
311. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(C). 
312. See supra notes 245–246 and accompanying text. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
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framework specific to combination products. Most courts in the Infuse/LT-
Cage and drug-eluting stent cases have not reached this part of the analysis 
because they have assumed that failure-to-warn cases are expressly 
preempted by section 360k. The next section addresses this assumption. 
3. Does Section 360k Apply to Combination Products? 
The third assumption most courts have made is that the scope of the 
express preemption provision in the Medical Device Amendments 
extends to combination products.315 Whether this is correct depends on 
whether Section 360k applies to products defined as medical devices or to 
products regulated as medical devices. Section 360k prohibits the states 
from “establish[ing] or continu[ing] in effect with respect to a 
device . . . any requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and which relates 
to the safety or effectiveness of the device.”316 
In determining the scope of this provision, as courts routinely note, 
“[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.”317 Unfortunately, 
neither a text-based, intent-based, nor purpose-based analysis affords a 
clear understanding of Congress’s purpose here. The plain text of the 
preemption provision refers to “a device” and “the device,” which seems 
most consistent with products statutorily defined as devices, not to 
products regulated as devices.318 That is, had Congress intended 
Section 360k to extend to products regulated as devices, Congress could 
have included the words “regulated as” in the statute. But on closer 
analysis, this argument breaks down. When Congress drafted the MDA in 
1976, a medical product’s statutory definition and its regulatory identity 
were congruent.319 The determination that a product satisfied the statutory 
definition for devices entailed a determination that the product would be 
regulated as a device. The distinction between statutory definition and 
regulatory identity was not created for another fourteen years, when 
Congress passed the SMDA. And the distinction did not become relevant 
for another two decades, when manufacturers first began to assert 
preemption defenses in combination products failure-to-warn cases. The 
plain text is thus ambiguous. 
                                                     
315. See supra notes 281–283 and accompanying text. 
316. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
317. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). 
318. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
319. See supra section I.A. 
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Nothing in the legislative history of the SMDA speaks directly to 
Congress’s specific intent regarding the applicability of section 360k to 
failure-to-warn claims against combination products manufacturers.320 
The limited legislative history concerning Section 16—mainly comments 
by the sponsors of the Senate’s version of the Act—suggests that 
Section 16 was a response to industry complaints over the burdens created 
by the need to secure separate approvals for each constituent of a 
combination product.321 Congress’s focus was on ensuring a smooth 
federal approval process by permitting manufacturers to submit the 
individual constituents to a single approval process, instead of requiring 
separate approvals for each.322 The best understanding is that no specific 
intent regarding preemption can be imputed to Congress as a whole, to the 
Act’s sponsors, or to any other subset of legislators. 
A purpose-based analysis is similarly unrewarding. Section 16 can be 
viewed as seeking to protect a then-fledgling and vulnerable combination 
products industry. By the time that Congress passed the SMDA, the 
benefits that drug-device combinations might offer had become apparent; 
it is reasonable to attribute a purpose of fostering the development of the 
combination products industry to the 101st Congress. Under this view, 
easing combination product manufacturers’ premarket burdens by 
requiring only a single approval was simply the specific measure that 
Congress employed to achieve this purpose. But the approval process set 
out in section 16 need not be the only mechanism that would be consistent 
with a market-fostering purpose. This suggests an analogy with the 94th 
Congress’s purposes in enacting the Medical Device Amendments, which 
included fostering a vulnerable medical device industry. Under a purpose-
based analysis, limiting manufacturers’ post-market liability is consistent 
with Congress’s broad purposes. 
But there are many problems with this argument. One is that the 94th 
Congress expressly addressed the issue of post-market liability for device 
manufacturers by including Section 360k in the MDA. This suggests that 
the earlier Congress may have had a broader purpose in mind when it 
enacted the MDA than did the later body that enacted the SMDA. Another 
is that a purpose-based analysis must consider the legislative 
background—the SMDA, like the MDA, was amending the FDCA. And 
                                                     
320. See generally 136 CONG. REC. 36,007 (1990). 
321. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,007, 36,162 (1990) (comments of Sen. Kennedy) (“[T]he legislation 
streamlines regulatory review procedures for so-called combination products. . . .”); id. at 36,163 
(comments of Sen. Dodd) (stating the same); id. (comments of Sen. Durenberger) (“I think it is 
important that we acted to streamline the regulatory barriers facing [combination] products.”). 
322. See id. at 36,162–36,163.  
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both Congress and the courts have recognized that a central purpose of the 
FDCA is to ensure the safety of drugs and devices approved for sale in the 
U.S. market.323 As with a textual and an intent-based analysis, a purpose-
based analysis cannot answer the question of whether Congress intended 
Section 360k to preempt failure-to-warn claims against drug-device 
combination products manufacturers. 
If the relevant identity in a preemption analysis is a combination 
product’s statutory identity, and if Section 360k applies only to products 
defined as a medical device, the necessary conclusion is that Section 360k 
does not preempt failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturers of 
drug-device combination products. But the analysis set out above is more 
consistent with the limited claim that the scope of Section 360k is 
ambiguous with respect to combination products. Courts could adopt 
either interpretation of the language of the express preemption provision. 
From the normative position from which this Article proceeds, 
extending the scope of Section 360k to combination products is 
undesirable because it subverts the calibrated information-forcing system 
of medical products regulation outlined in section I.C. The information-
forcing account views Section 360k as one of the means used to calibrate 
manufacturers’ obligations to produce and disseminate information about 
product risk and the burden of producing and disseminating that 
information. Because device risks can be forecast based on a limited set 
of factors, a somewhat limited federal layer (PMA, not NDA approval) 
and preemption of the state layer facilitate the production and 
dissemination of enough information to ensure safety.324 But unlike non-
combination devices, the risks posed by a drug-device combination cannot 
be determined by examining a limited set of factors. As discussed earlier, 
these products present all the unpredictable risks of new drugs, plus 
qualitative super-additive risks that the scientific community cannot 
foresee.325 Thus, the information needed to ensure safety actually exceeds 
the information needed for a non-combination new drug. Hence, a more 
robust approach, requiring more, rather than less, information about risk 
is desirable. 
C. Explaining Courts’ Decisions in the Combination Products Cases 
Courts have assumed the answers to three key questions about the 
nature of combination products and the scope of Section 360k, two of 
which have led them to find that failure-to-warn claims against drug-
                                                     
323. See supra note 9. 
324. See supra section I.C. 
325. See supra section II.B. 
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device combination product manufacturers are preempted. Part IV turns 
to the question of what can be done to narrow the regulatory gap. But first, 
several potential explanations for courts’ preemption decisions should be 
addressed here. One context-specific explanation is that the focus in the 
Infuse/LT-Cage cases has not been on these questions. Rather, in the 
Infuse/LT-Cage product cases, litigants and courts have focused on the 
fact that nearly 90% of the uses of the product were off-label, and on the 
argument that Medtronic aggressively (and illegally) promoted this off-
label use. Most plaintiffs have assumed that Section 360k would apply to 
the Infuse/LT-Cage product absent the manufacturer’s off-label 
promotion. Plaintiffs have attempted to avoid preemption by arguing that 
the off-label promotion vitiates the preemptive effect of Section 360k. 
Most, but not all, courts have rejected this argument.326 And the courts 
that have rejected the off-label argument have gone on to conduct 
preemption analyses, assuming the answers to the key questions regarding 
the construction of the statutory term “combination product” and the 
scope of Section 360k. Thus, the focus on Medtronic’s off-label 
promotion does not explain the Infuse/LT-Cage cases. 
The attempts to explain the Supreme Court’s recent drug and device 
preemption holdings described earlier can be applied to the lower courts’ 
holdings in the combination products cases.327 Many scholars have 
located doctrinal sources for the Supreme Court’s holdings, particularly 
that the Court has inverted the presumption against preemption into a 
presumption in favor of preemption.328 Others have focused on the critical 
attitudes attributed to certain Justices concerning the effects of tort and 
product liability law. Still others have described the Court’s preemption 
decisions as a manifestation a pro-business or a deregulatory agenda that 
some justices seek to implement.329 These explanations can apply 
directly to the lower court decisions in the combination products cases. 
That is, lower court judges may share these doctrinal and policy views. 
The explanations may also apply indirectly, in that lower court judges 
                                                     
326. See e.g., Ramirez v. Medtronic Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 977, 996 (D. Ariz. 2013) (discussing how 
off-label promotion obviates need for plaintiff to plead a parallel claim). 
327. See supra notes 163–178 and accompanying text. 
328. See Chemerinsky, supra note 164, at 1319 (“The only way to make sense of the [Geier] case 
is to see it as putting a presumption in favor of preemption.”); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the 
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968 (2002) (“It is inescapable: there is a 
presumption in favor of preemption.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (2011) (“Watters v. Wachovia Bank appeared to apply a presumption in 
favor of preemption.”) (emphasis in original).  
329. Sharkey, The Anti-Deference Pro-Preemption Paradox, supra note 174, at 806; see also id. at 
809 n.14 (listing scholars who have argued that the Roberts Court’s decisions embody a pro-business, 
anti-regulatory agenda). 
10 - Horvath.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2019  10:49 AM 
2019] EMERGENT REGULATORY SYSTEMS 1755 
 
may rule strategically, recognizing the views of the court or courts 
above them and aiming to minimize the likelihood of being reversed 
on appeal. 
But the analysis in section III.B suggests that lower courts’ preemption 
findings in the drug-device combination products cases arise from an analytic 
move antecedent to the preemption analysis itself. The lower courts have 
been making key assumptions based on their conception of combination 
products. Assuming that drug-device combination products are medical 
devices determines the input into the preemption analysis, and as shown 
above, this determines the output of that analysis. This observation begs the 
question of why courts have routinely made this assumption. The opinions in 
these cases contain little to nothing that helps to answer this question. This 
section offers three possible, non-exclusive explanations. 
First, litigants have rarely emphasized the distinct nature of 
combination products, either as products qua products or as legally 
constructed entities.330 In most cases courts have heard from both sides 
that drug-device combination products are devices. 
Second, the defendants in these cases have all been medical device 
manufacturers. A natural assumption—and one that courts could 
justifiably make over many decades—would be that a product made by a 
device manufacturer is a device. This is no longer a safe assumption. 
Companies that had once developed only devices or only drugs are now 
increasingly creating products that combine devices and drugs. 
Medtronic, a self-described medical device company,331 markets 
combination products including drug-eluting stents, steroid-eluting 
pacemaker and defibrillator leads, implantable drug infusion pumps, and 
the Infuse/LT-Cage product.332 Mylan, a self-described pharmaceutical 
company,333 markets combination products including the EpiPen and the 
                                                     
330. See supra, notes 279–280 and accompanying text. 
331. See Mission Statement, MEDTRONIC, http://www.medtronic.com/us-en/about/mission.html 
[https://perma.cc/CMN3-SMUK] (stating the company mission is “[t]o contribute to human welfare 
by application of biomedical engineering in the research, design, manufacture, and sale of instruments 
or appliances.”). 





o=&znumber=&pagenum=500 [https://perma.cc/3XMA-5KKA] (listing eighteen original PMA 
approved combination products and over 500 original and PMA supplement approvals for 
combination products). 
333. See About Us, MYLAN.COM, http://www.mylan.com/en/company/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/22QW-DVDM] (describing product line as “prescription generic, branded generic, 
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MTFS, a transdermal patch that delivers a generic form of Fentanyl. 
The third possible explanation is that combination products and the 
federal combination products regulatory regime have emerged through a 
poorly recognized process of incremental evolution. This has been a very 
different process than the process that created the regulatory regimes for 
drugs, devices, and biological products. Congress created federal 
authority over drugs, devices, and biologicals after highly publicized, 
tragic events caused by one or a few specific products.334 In effect, widely 
reported crises led to the creation of regulatory regimes in landmark 
pieces of legislation. By contrast, the combination products regulatory 
regime did not emerge out of tragedy. Rather, the regime was created in a 
largely unnoticed provision of an amendment to an existing regime, in 
response to industry complaints about premarket burdens. Perhaps the 
gradual evolution of a distinct product category has eluded recognition. 
Two important points hopefully emerge from this Part. First, although 
there is a tendency to channel combination product approval through the 
device pathways, this channeling is not a necessary outcome under 
existing statutes and regulations. Second, although courts have almost all 
found state tort and products liability claims to be preempted, this is not a 
necessary outcome under existing statutes, regulations, and Supreme 
Court precedent. These points suggest that the regulatory gap itself may 
not be a necessary feature of combination products regulation. 
IV. NARROWING THE REGULATORY GAP 
The normative position this Article takes is that a layered, calibrated 
system of information obligations strikes a desirable balance between 
assuring medical product safety and permitting innovation and timely 
access. From this position, drug-device combination products, which 
present the unforeseeable risks of new drugs and the qualitative 
synergistic risks of drug-device interactions, should be regulated by the 
most rigorous, two-layered approach—the federal NDA premarket 
evaluation process and state law post-market failure-to-warn liability. But 
both the federal and the state sides of this regulatory scheme now function 
in a truncated fashion. Sections IV.A and IV.B explore the available 
means by which the federal and state sides of the gap may be narrowed. 
In effect, this Part tests the proposition that the emergent regulatory 
system for medical products can survive the challenge presented by 
combination products. 
                                                     
brand-name . . . drugs, as well as over-the-counter (OTC) remedies”). 
334. Paradise et al., supra note 66, at 614. 
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A. Narrowing the Federal Side of the Gap: The FDA’s Options 
Part III reached the conclusion that channeling combination product 
premarket approval through the device pathways is not a necessary 
outcome under existing statutes and regulations. In fact, the FDA retains 
sufficient statutory authority under which it could narrow, but not 
completely close, the regulatory gap. First, the FDA could ensure robust 
risk information production by assigning more drug-device combination 
products the regulatory identity of a drug. The SMDA vested the authority 
to assign the regulatory identity of combination products to the Secretary 
of HHS, who delegates this authority to the FDA.335 The SMDA also 
contained a rule of decision for making this assignment, the primary mode 
of action test.336 In determining the primary mode of action, the FDA must 
“evaluat[e] scientific data within its technical expertise,” a classic exercise 
of discretion by an expert agency to which courts typically defer.337 Thus, 
the agency could, in effect, re-channel combination product approvals into 
the drug pathways. 
This might appear to run counter to the SMDA, given that the Act 
created a rule (the primary mode of action) for assigning regulatory 
identity that makes it easier for the FDA to assign a device identity.338 But 
the legislative history suggests that Section 16 was intended to ease 
manufacturers’ burdens by requiring only a single approval process for 
any given combination product, not to channel the specific approval 
process into any specific pathway. Requiring the FDA to assign a 
regulatory identity based on the primary mode of action arguably serves 
merely to prevent every drug-device combination product from being 
regulated as a drug (as would occur were the Agency to use the earlier test 
based on the achievement of intended effects through any drug action). 
Where the primary mode of action is at all unclear, the FDA could assign 
combination products to CDER for regulation under the agency’s more 
rigorous drug authorities. 
Second, the FDA could improve the information-generating function 
of the PMA process by requiring more rigorous pivotal study design, for 
example by insisting on larger sample sizes, blinding of subjects and 
investigators, the use of sham interventions for the control group, and 
                                                     
335. Pub. L. No. 101-62, § 16, 104 Stat. 4511, 4526 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2012)). 
336. Id. 
337. Prevor v. FDA, 895 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Shalala, 923 F. Supp. 212, 216 (D.D.C. 1996)). 
338. See supra notes 244–253 and accompanying text. 
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randomized assignment to treatment or control groups.339 These changes 
have been suggested for non-combination high-risk devices by medical 
scholars. In the combination products context, these steps could improve 
the quantity and quality of information available to regulators, prescribers, 
and patients. 
However, a number of considerations ultimately limit the utility of 
these approaches. Although the FDA has discretion in making its 
determination of the primary mode of action and although this type of 
determination typically receives Chevron deference, in at least one line of 
recent cases a court has given the Agency’s assignment of a regulatory 
identity a very hard look.340 Given the stakes of this assignment for the 
manufacturer, it would not be surprising if FDA assignments of a drug 
regulatory identity to combination products were frequently and 
vigorously challenged. The Prevor cases suggest that courts might seek to 
constrain the FDA’s latitude in making regulatory identity assignments. 
The FDA’s ability to require more robust clinical data is also limited. 
Although blinded, randomized, controlled trials have traditionally been 
regarded as the gold standard, for many device-containing products it is 
difficult to design a trial with a true control arm. Consider the Infuse/TL-
Cage product. At the time the manufacturer sought approval there was a 
surgically-implanted alternative which could serve as the control. Absent 
that alternative, a truly blinded, controlled trial might have required a 
control arm whose subjects underwent a sham surgery. Performing sham 
interventions in clinical trials has traditionally been considered 
unethical.341 And even if this ethical limitation could be overcome, 
enrolling subjects in a study using sham interventions would be difficult. 
Further, increasing sample size may not be possible because many 
products that include a medical device are used in far fewer patients than 
are drugs.342 
Thus, attempts to address the regulatory gap through administrative-
level efforts can, at best, marginally narrow the gap. The very nature of 
drug-device combination products leads to the conclusion that they will 
reach the market with a more limited quantum of risk information than 
non-combination new drugs. This leaves state failure-to-warn actions as 
                                                     
339. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the less rigorous nature of 
the PMA process. 
340. See Prevor, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 97 (applying “a thorough, probing, in-depth review” to find 
that FDA had failed to articulate the reasons for its assignment); Prevor v. FDA (Prevor II), 67 F. 
Supp. 3d 125, 137 (D.D.C. 2014) (reciting the Chevron standard while rejecting FDA’s determination 
of primary mode of action). 
341. See Dhruva et al., supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
342. See id. 
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the remaining mechanism through which the information deficit created 
by approving new drugs through the PMA pathway might be narrowed. 
B. Narrowing the State Side of the Gap: The Miller v. Mylan, Inc. 
Approach 
Part III also drew the conclusion that the preemption of all state tort 
and products liability claims against the manufacturers of drug-device 
combination products is not a necessary outcome under existing statutes, 
regulations, and Supreme Court precedent. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Miller v. Mylan, Inc.343 provides a paradigm for an alternative approach 
to the preemption analysis in these cases. Miller required courts to 
interpret the scope of a state statute that functions analogously to 
section 360k by expressly shielding the manufacturers of certain drugs 
from liability under state tort and products liability law. The case involved 
Mylan’s “MFTS” product, a generic version of the fentanyl transdermal 
patch which is designed to provide a slow and steady infusion of the potent 
analgesic fentanyl through the skin. The FDA classifies transdermal 
patches as combination products and assigns regulatory responsibility to 
CDER, which uses drug and device authorities “as necessary.”344 
Miller arose after Beth Ann Kelly died as the result of a Mylan MFTS 
malfunction, which led to the delivery of a dose of fentanyl several-fold 
greater than the therapeutic dose. Kelly’s estate sued the manufacturer 
under a variety of state law theories. Mylan moved for dismissal under 
section 600.2946(5),345 a Michigan statute that provides that “a product 
that is a drug is not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the 
manufacturer or seller is not liable, if the drug was approved for safety 
and efficacy by the [FDA], and the drug and its labeling were in 
compliance with the [FDA]’s approval.”346 
The district court found that Mylan’s product was a drug, based on the 
FDA’s assignment of a regulatory identity: “[t]here is no question that in 
considering Mylan’s ANDA, the FDA deemed the MFTS, the patch, to be 
a drug; not a device and not something less than its whole.”347 The court 
                                                     
343. Miller v. Mylan, Inc. (Miller II), 741 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2014). 
344. Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and the Center 
for Devices and Radiological Health, FDA (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/CombinationProducts/JurisdictionalInformation/ucm121177.htm 
[https://perma.cc/36YT-3XR5]. 
345. Miller II, 741 F.3d at 677. 
346. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5) (2019). 
347. Miller v. Mylan Inc. (Miller I), No. 12-11684, 2012 WL 5300721, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 
2012), rev’d, 741 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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held that section 600.2946(5), coupled with Mylan’s compliance with 
FDA-imposed requirements, provided Mylan with immunity. 
The Sixth Circuit reversed in a split decision.348 All three members of 
the panel agreed that under federal statute and FDA regulation, 
“combination product” is a distinct product category.349 The majority 
explained that the Safe Medical Devices Act had “create[d] a distinction 
between how a product is defined and how that product will be 
regulated.”350 The majority found that under the FDCA, the fentanyl patch 
is statutorily defined as a combination product, and that FDA regulates 
the combination product as a drug.351 The dissent accepted the majority’s 
distinction between statutory definition and regulatory identity, but 
disagreed with the conclusion that MFTS fits the statutory definition of a 
combination product.352 Thus, all three members of the panel parted ways 
with the majority of courts in the Infuse/LT-Cage, drug-eluting stent, and 
other combination products cases, recognizing that combination products 
are not, as a matter of statutory definition, drugs or devices. Rather, the 
Sixth Circuit recognized that combination products must be conceived of 
as sui generis entities. 
The majority construed the Michigan statute as conferring immunity 
only on the manufacturers of products statutorily defined as “drugs,” but 
not on the manufacturers of products statutorily defined as “combination 
products.”353 The majority rejected Mylan’s argument that the FDA’s 
assignment of a regulatory identity was the relevant consideration. To the 
majority, the relevant consideration for determining whether a state statute 
shielding the manufacturer of a drug from state common law liability was 
the product’s statutory definition.354 
Miller is germane to the combination products cases. The facts in these 
cases are analogous: plaintiffs brought failure-to-warn claims for injuries 
caused by a product the FDA found to meet that statutory definition of a 
combination product. And the statutes on which the defendants relied, 
Michigan’s section 600.2946(5) and Congress’s 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), are 
cast in analogous terms, except that the Michigan provision refers to “a 
product that is a drug,” while the federal provision refers “to a device.” 
                                                     
348. Miller II, 741 F.3d at 675. 
349. Id. at 677, 681. 
350. Id. at 677. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. at 681 (McKeague, J., dissenting) (“I turn to those [federal drug, device, and combination 
product] definitions to see if Mylan’s Fentanyl Transdermal System is a combination product.”). 
353. Id. at 677–678 (majority opinion).  
354. Id. at 677. 
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The Miller Court explicitly addressed the questions most other courts have 
overlooked. Miller’s key analytic moves—recognizing that “combination 
products” are a distinct product category and that statutory language 
extending the scope of coverage to a medical product category refers to 
the product’s statutory definition, not the regulatory identity—provide 
answers to the questions identified in section III.B. These answers would 
lead courts to different preemption outcomes than most have reached. 
Under the Miller approach, Section 360k, by its terms, applies solely to 
“devices,”355 and not to products regulated as devices. The FDA’s 
interpretation of Section 360k, by the terms of the implementing 
regulation, likewise applies solely to devices.356 Under the reasoning in 
Miller, combination products, regardless of how they are regulated, are 
not devices, and so the express preemption provision, section 360k, would 
not apply. 
As yet, no court has adopted the Miller approach in a federal 
preemption analysis involving a combination product. But the Sixth 
Circuit’s analysis casts an important light on those cases. A few other 
courts have used similar reasoning. One early combination products case 
involved a prosthetic heat valve (a device) that incorporated an 
antibacterial coating of silver (a drug).357 Patients who received this valve 
had an elevated risk of developing a failure of the connection between the 
valve and the heart, which can lead to life-threatening complications.358 
The plaintiffs asserted that the valve was a drug-device combination 
product, and thus, that the express preemption provision of the MDA 
should not apply.359 To the Minnesota District Court, the product’s 
statutory definition was crucial: “the express preemption principles and 
case law . . . do not apply to combination products or to drugs.”360 And in 
a patent term extension case under Section 156 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the PTO’s finding that a drug 
                                                     
355. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012) (“[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or 
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—(1) which is 
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device. . . .”). 
356. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2019) (“State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food 
and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations . . . applicable to a particular 
device under the act. . . .”). 
357. In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 01–1396 JRTFLN, 
2004 WL 45503, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004), rev’d 425 F.3d 1116 (8th Cir. 2005). 
358. Id. 
359. Id. at *14. The FDA does not consider the Silzone to be a combination product, but rather a 
Class III medical device. Id. at *3. 
360. Id. 
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eluting stent (the Zilver PTX) was a medical device simply because the 
FDA regulated it as such.361 Rather “the FDA’s determination of a primary 
mode of action is merely an identification of the predominate means by 
which the product achieves its therapeutic effect,” establishing only the 
regulatory identity.362 
The Miller approach appears to be permissible under existing statutes 
and FDA regulations. Thus, courts have the means at their disposal to 
narrow the regulatory gap they have helped to create. Courts could adopt 
the Miller court’s approach to Section 360k and find that the express 
preemption language there does not apply to combination products. But 
the utility of this approach is also limited. Courts would still need to 
address the application of implied preemption principles in these cases.363 
Here, the question would be which approach to implied preemption courts 
would take. One possibility is that state failure-to-warn actions would not 
fit through the narrow statutory gap created by Riegel and Buckman.364 
State tort and products liability verdicts would require the manufacturer 
to change the product label that the FDA requires, creating an apparent 
conflict. But FDA regulations contain a route through which the 
manufacturer of a PMA-approved device can change its labeling in 
response to new safety information,365 analogous to the CBE provisions 
at issue in Wyeth.366 Thus, manufacturers could comply with both federal 
and state labeling requirements, suggesting that courts would find state 
tort and products liability actions against combination products regulated 
as devices not to be impliedly preempted. Alternatively, Riegel and 
Buckman, which concerned products statutorily defined as devices, might 
not apply to cases involving products statutorily defined as combination 
products. Courts might well need to return to first principles, defining an 
implied preemption rule for combination products based on their 
interpretation of Congress’s preemptive intent. 
None of these suggestions can completely close the regulatory gap for 
high-risk device-new drug combination products. Because of the practical 
and ethical limitations discussed in section IV.A, these products will 
inevitably reach the market with a lesser quantum of risk information than 
                                                     
361. Angiotech Pharm. Inc. v. Lee, 191 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
362. Id.  
363. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000) (stating that implied preemption 
principles apply even where an express preemption provision is present). 
364. Id. at 868.  
365. 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d)(1) (2019). 
366. See supra section I.A. Because the express preemption provision has allowed courts to dispose 
of cases, this provision has not litigated. 
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non-combination new drugs or high-risk devices by themselves. And 
because of the sweeping, implied preemption rule established by 
Buckman,367 adopting the Miller approach would not necessarily allow 
state failure-to-warn claims to proceed. Further, because state common 
law actions are sub-optimal information-forcing mechanisms,368 post-
market liability would at best serve a function that may be described as 
too-little-too-late. What this indicates is that, by themselves, the 
suggestions offered in this Part are not sufficient to close the regulatory 
gap. Because the deficit in knowledge about drug-device combination 
product risk arises in large part from unforeseeable qualitative risks, the 
gap is a consequence of combination products themselves. If the gap is to 
be closed, it is incumbent on the scientific community to develop the 
means to monitor for and ultimately to predict these risks. 
V. VIEWING MEDICAL PRODUCT REGULATION AS AN 
EMERGENT SYSTEM: UTILITY AND LIMITATIONS 
The analysis of the combination products cases just presented is 
premised on the view of medical products regulation through FDA 
approval and state common law as a coherent, calibrated system of 
information-producing duties that emerges from the functioning of several 
independent regulatory inputs. This view differs from the common view 
of FDA premarket approval and state post-market tort and products 
liability law as inherently conflicting systems. This Part describes a number 
of advantages of this approach, and assess two significant criticisms. 
Critical to this Article is the recognition that a regulatory system can 
achieve certain effects through the function of many independent regulatory 
subsystems, each of which seeks to achieve other sets of policy objectives. In 
the medical product context, the NDA, ANDA, PMA, and Section 510(k) 
premarket processes all embody different balances of partially overlapping 
sets of policies.369 State tort and product liability law embodies yet other 
policy balances. And the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions explicitly 
recognized yet other considerations.370 The relative priority assigned to 
incentivizing the generation and dissemination of risk information varies 
widely across these regulatory subsystems. But the overall system that 
emerges from these subsystems prioritizes the imposition of a calibrated 
system of information obligations on medical product manufacturers. 
                                                     
367. See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text. 
368. See supra notes 148–157 and accompanying text. 
369. See supra section I.A. 
370. See supra sections I.B, I.D. 
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In isolation, the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions in Wyeth and 
PLIVA appear to create bizarre outcomes.371 Yet when viewed as parts of 
system that calibrates information generating obligations to information 
deficits, these decisions take on very different valence—they make sense. 
The converse is also true. Viewing federal and state regulation of medical 
products as an emergent system can make evident how decisions that are 
seemingly consistent with the existing regulatory structure actually 
deviate from, or even subvert, that structure. In the cases involving 
combination products, the lower federal and state courts have cast their 
preemption decisions as aligning comfortably with existing preemption 
jurisprudence.372 Indeed, if drug-device combination products are devices, 
or if Section 360k applies to all products regulated as devices, the majority 
approach does align with the existing case law. But from the perspective 
adopted here, preemption decisions that eliminate the state-based second 
layer of information-forcing are inconsistent with the function of the 
more-broadly conceived regulatory system. This inconsistency led to the 
recognition that courts’ preemption analyses have been reliant on certain 
key, unwarranted assumptions. 
Another benefit is that this approach shifts the focus toward 
perspectives more closely aligned with those of the regulated entities and 
with others who are impacted by the totality of the regulatory inputs. In 
the medical products context, device and pharma companies considering 
whether to embark on development projects may make decisions based on 
the totality of their information-producing obligations and their 
anticipated costs and risks. Prescribers and patients may select products 
based on the totality of information available about risk and benefit. Each 
individual subsystem at each level of regulation contributes only a portion 
of the manufacturer’s obligations and risks and of the information that is 
available. But to the product developers and users, the totality of the 
information is key. 
A third benefit is that conceiving of a regulatory system as the emergent 
result of multiple subsystems is that this conception makes clear how 
small changes to any part of any of the subsystems can impact the effects 
of the overall system. If, as I have just argued, recent preemption decisions 
in drug-device combination products cases represent a change, the effects 
of that change extend far beyond drug eluting stents and spinal fusion 
products. As combination products come to account for a strong plurality 
of all medical products, removing the state layer of information forcing 
                                                     
371. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 625 (2011) (“We recognize that from the [plaintiffs’] 
perspective . . . finding pre-emption here but not in Wyeth makes little sense.”); id. at 643 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the “decision leads to so many absurd consequences. . . .”). 
372. See supra notes 281–284 and accompanying text. 
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from this large category of products for which risk is inherently 
unpredictable will make it impossible to view medical product regulation 
as a coherent system of calibrated information-forcing obligations. In 
effect, a new regulatory system may be emerging. This in turn points out 
how fragile regulatory systems can be. If small changes to any one piece 
of the system can disrupt the normatively desirable functions of that 
system, continuity is unlikely. 
One important criticism that may be leveled at this Article is that the 
exercise of finding emergent regulatory systems is too malleable to be of 
much significance. Simply by manipulating the scope of the regulated entity, 
and by arbitrarily selecting regulatory goals and regulatory inputs, one can 
find an emergent system almost anywhere. The analysis presented in this 
Article attempts to avoid this danger. The choice of the scope of the regulated 
entity was not overinclusive. Defining the regulated entity to consist of the 
manufacturers of prescription drugs, medical devices, and biologics is 
consistent with most scholarly accounts of medical product regulation. These 
accounts typically exclude other FDA-regulated products such as food and 
cosmetics, and other consumer products that may impact health. Nor was the 
choice of scope underinclusive. The topic—combination medical products—
suggests that the barriers between drugs, devices, and biologics, and between 
their manufacturers, are rapidly breaking down.373 And scholarly 
commentary has indicated that the regulation of these products should no 
longer be conducted in separate silos.374 
The choice of regulatory goal is more open to challenge. My 
prioritization of ensuring medical product safety is, of course, a normative 
one, to which my past as a clinician predisposes. Some members of the 
medical products industry have maintained that the purpose of regulation 
is to ensure a well-functioning marketplace of new and innovative 
products. The Supreme Court has, in recent decisions, echoed this view. 
As noted above, though, many of the significant pieces of legislation that 
form the federal regulatory regime cite the goal of ensuring that medical 
products are safe. Several landmark pieces of legislation, including the 
Biologics Control Act, the FDCA, and the MDA arose out of highly 
publicized catastrophes involving medical products.375 And state tort and 
products liability law have long been seen as part of the states’ police 
power to ensure safety and wellbeing. 
                                                     
373. See supra notes 331–333 and accompanying text. 
374. See, e.g., Foote & Berlin, supra note 4, at 641–44. 
375. See generally id. 
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Finally, my choice of regulatory inputs is consistent with the existing 
scholarly literature, which focuses on FDA approval and state tort and 
products liability law.376 However, there is an under-inclusiveness 
problem that must be recognized here. Information-forcing comes from 
many sources, not just from federal premarket evaluation and state post-
market tort and products liability law. The FDA can require 
manufacturers, in certain contexts, to conduct post-market studies to 
ensure safety. The FDCA contains many reporting requirements. Medical 
researchers perform studies of drugs, devices, and biologics, and often 
uncover new information about risk.377 And patient and consumer 
networks, greatly aided by the connectedness afforded by social media, 
can aggregate isolated adverse events and bring problems to light.378 
Every one of these can be seen as a form of regulation, in that they may 
incentivize manufacturers to somehow change their behavior. The 
challenge is to construct a model with a manageable number of inputs. 
A second potential criticism is that the emergent system that section I.C 
describes is less well-calibrated than I have indicated. section I.C has 
already addressed the limitations of state tort and products liability law as 
information-forcing systems.379 Another weakness is centered on the 
regulation of intermediate-risk devices. The Section 510(k) notification 
process does not require the production of clinical data about risk. And in 
many circuits, state failure-to-warn claims are very likely to be preempted. 
Thus, the information deficit about risk appears to be untouched by the 
emergent regulatory system. One important point to recall, though, is that 
under the mid-twentieth century understanding of medical devices that the 
system embodies, device risks in general were predictable in advance of 
any clinical testing, and the risks of Class II devices were more predictable 
than those of Class III devices. 
CONCLUSION 
A functional account of the regulation of traditional medical products, 
including federal and state regulation of prescription drugs and medical 
devices, describes an emergent, calibrated mechanism that incentivizes 
manufacturers to generate and disclose the optimal amount of information 
                                                     
376. See, e.g., Sharkey, States Versus ADA, supra note 10 at 1610. 
377. See generally Carragee, Hurwitz & Weiner, supra note 228 (reviewing post-market clinical 
trials that revealed the complication rates associated with the Infuse/LT-Cage product). 
378. Diane Bloom et al., The Rules of Engagement: CTTI Recommendations for Successful 
Collaborations Between Sponsors and Patient Groups Around Clinical Trials, 52 THERAPEUTIC & 
REG. SCI. 208, 208 (2018) (discussing role of patient groups in monitoring drug safety). 
379. See supra, notes 148–157. 
10 - Horvath.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2019  10:49 AM 
2019] EMERGENT REGULATORY SYSTEMS 1767 
 
about product risk. The amount of information required is based on the 
ability to predict the risks that a product presents and the burdens that 
information production and dissemination impose. But a new and rapidly 
growing product category—combination products—threatens to upend 
this calibrated information-forcing system. Drug-device combination 
products may pose risks that are more difficult to predict than the risks of 
any other product category. But the manufacturer of a new drug can avoid 
the rigorous and costly NDA process by submitting the new drug as a 
constituent of a combination product, which may be approved through the 
less-rigorous device pathway. And, under many recent lower court 
decisions, the manufacturer will be shielded from state failure-to-warn 
claims. The regulatory gap that results causes hundreds of thousands of 
Americans, or more, to be exposed to new drugs, the risks of which are 
not understood to the same extent as are the risks posed by other new 
drugs. Both the FDA and the courts have the means to narrow—but not to 
completely eliminate—the regulatory gap. 
 
